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GERRISH
SOME REFLECTIONS ON RECENT LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY

HUTCHISON
SCIENCE, VALUES, AND CHRISTIAN FAITH

LITTLE
PRINCIPALITIES AND POWERS AND THE CHRISTIAN ETHIC

PAUCK
ADOLF VON HARNACK'S INTERPRETATION OF CHURCH HISTORY

PSYCHIATRY & RELIGION
A SURVEY OF RECENT WORKS

BOOK REVIEWS

UNION SEMINARY QUARTERLY REVIEW

TO PROMOTE THOUGHT AND ACTION IN THE SERVICE OF CHRIST

VOLUME XIII, NUMBER 3 MARCH 1958

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A Conversation Resumed: Some Reflections on Recent Linguistic Philosophy

Brian Gerrish

Nuclear warfare is not the only threat posed by the enormous advances of recent science. For a while science also seemed likely to put the philosophers out of business—a less alarming prospect, no doubt, especially for those of us who are not philosophers; but an interesting one, which has had important consequences for theology. The rift between science and philosophy is comparatively recent. Aristotle drew no distinction between them, and it is noteworthy that even in the late seventeenth century Sir Isaac Newton could style himself a "philosopher." The break came as progress was made within the specialised departments of the sciences, and the general oversight exercised by philosophy no longer seemed necessary. And some philosophers, notably Kant, widened the breach still further. Philosophy was left like an old imperialist power in an anti-colonial age, her former dependencies jealously asserting their autonomy. The problem for philosophy only became desperate at the beginning of our own century, by which time even the "social" and "mental" sciences had broken free from political and moral philosophy.

What is there left for philosophy to do, now that the last of the fledglings have left the nest, except to grow old and gray as the "superannuated handmaid of theology"? This is the problem which underlies much of the philosophy of the twentieth century, and it also goes far to explain the rise of so-called "linguistic analysis." A twentieth-century philosophy must fulfil three requirements: (1) it must not be reducible to any of the established sciences; yet (2) it must be as exact as they are in method, and (3) it must not abandon their basic empirical presuppositions. What may be *known* is the business of the

scientist: to a large section of twentieth-century philosophers this has seemed to leave for them only the task of *clarifying* what may be known. For them, the business of philosophy has become increasingly concerned with words — the deliverances of the sciences and of the everyday observations with which, in some measure, the natural sciences are continuous. Science is talk about facts; philosophy, talk about talk.

Obviously, there will be far-reaching consequences for theology whenever philosophy takes a fresh turn. For the history of Christian thought has in large part been determined by the perennial conversation of philosophers and theologians. When scientism and linguistic analysis joined, however, and gave birth to an aggressive and belligerent offspring, "logical positivism," conversation was broken off; and the theologians turned for inspiration to existentialism, Whiteheadian naturalism, and a refurbished Thomism. But now linguistic philosophy has produced a brood of amiable sceptics, who are eager to talk about anything — even religion; it is the theologians who are now (with some notable exceptions) showing themselves morose and taciturn, unwilling to resume the interrupted conversation.

What has brought about this change in mood on the part of the linguistic philosophers? And just how dead is logical positivism? These are the two questions which will here be raised in turn, and answered, I am afraid, from the somewhat insular standpoint of contemporary British philosophy.

I

It is still logical positivism that springs to the minds of the uninitiated when they hear mention made of linguistic philosophy. This is unfortunate, for logical positivism was not first in the linguistic field, nor is its theory of meaning very widely accepted today.

1. Meaning and Naming

What is it that we are asking for when we enquire: "What does this word mean?" What is it for a word to have meaning? What is the meaning of "meaning"? Many philosophers have though that at least part of what we are asking for is what the word in question *refers to*. This can best be illustrated by a proper-name — indeed, so far as proper-names are concerned the theory is quite plausible. What do I mean when I talk about "Mr. Eisenhower"? Clearly, I am referring to the men whom we all know as the President of the United States.

"Mr. Eisenhower" (in inverted commas) *means* Mr. Eisenhower (without inverted commas). And the theory is that all words behave in the same way: they refer to, they name, something or somebody; or else they are ingredients in compound expressions ("many-worded names," as John Stuart Mill called them) which perform the same function. Gilbert Ryle has given this theory a very apt label, the " 'Fido'-Fido theory of meaning": like the dog Fido, every object answers to a name; and, like the name "Fido," every word names an object.

Of course, it is not hard to see the difficulties. The achievement of Mill, who was (with qualifications which need not detain us) the father of the theory, lay not so much in the correctness of his views as in the fact that he offered a theory of meaning at all. The main difficulty is that only one class of words in any language is composed of nouns, and yet the theory requires us to think of every word as having an object which it names. Further, sometimes two different words or expressions are used to refer to the same object without having the same meaning. We would not ordinarily say that "The President of the United States" *means* the same as "The former President of Columbia University," though the two expressions may be used to *refer to* the same individual. Yet this is the theory of meaning which won acceptance in nineteenth-century British philosophy, and a theory in many respects similar was propagated in Continental Europe by Meinong. When G. E. Moore inaugurated the programme of "analysis" at Cambridge round about the turn of the century, he was heavily under the influence of Meinong. Just how far the " 'Fido'-Fido theory of meaning" dominated Cambridge at this time could be illustrated from Russell's discussion of the statement "I am in my room" (*Problems of Philosophy*, 1912): even the word "in" denotes something which, if it does not exist, certainly "subsists." I think it is clear why these early views of Russell and Moore were dubbed "analytic platonism": their theory of words left them with a platonic world of being, comprising, in addition to universals like dog, such fictitious things as unicorns, impossible things like round squares, and unimaginable things like "ins." And the ghost of Fido still haunted the "logical atomism" which superseded the earlier platonism, since the logical atomists continued to think of words as referring to ("picturing" or "mirroring") facts.

2. Meaning and Verification

At this point — in the late 1920's — the logical positivists come in. ("Logical postivism," by the way, is a term descriptive of the philosophical opinions of the "Vienna Circle," constituted officially in

1928: it is not a general label to be plastered all over the world of linguistic philosophers.) The Austrian philosophers put forward a new theory of meaning, expressed in the familiar slogan, "The meaning of a statement is the method of its verification." We notice at once that the units of meaning (so to say) with which they were concerned were whole statements, not isolated words or expressions. But more important is the attempt to connect meaning with verification. More simply formulated, the slogan said: "Your statement has no meaning if you don't know how it could be verified." And, of course, "verified" meant "verified by sensory experience."

Now, on this view, the statement "There are mountains on the far side of the moon" is meaningful because, although I cannot verify it, I do know how it could be verified. The statement is verifiable in principle: the only reason why we cannot test it at the moment is because we are not yet in possession of the techniques which would enable us to go and have a look; but it is quite conceivable that we will be when there is room aboard a satellite for us. The proposition "God exists," on the other hand, neither can nor could be verified by any sensory experience whatever. From a purely psychological premiss ("I have such-and-such experiences") an existential conclusion ("Therefore there exists a God who causes my experiences") could never be inferred with logical certainty.

3. Meaning and Use

The so-called "verification principle" was criticised in detail by philosophers of various schools. But of greater significance than these piecemeal criticisms was the proposal of yet another theory of meaning, which has virtually made logical positivism obsolete and opened the door to rather less strained relations between philosophers and theologians. The newest theory was propounded by Ludwig Wittgenstein at Cambridge in the 1930's — and for Wittgenstein it meant, incidentally, a total revision of his own theory of language, since, in an earlier phase, he had adopted and developed the logical atomism of Russell. We are here concerned with "Wittgenstein II," who wrote the highly influential *Philosophical Investigations* (published posthumously, in 1953), not with "Wittgenstein I," the author of the *Tractatus* (1922) and one of the chief moving influences behind the Vienna Circle.

When Meinong asked "What does this word mean?" he was asking what the word named or referred to. When the logical positivists (Ayer, say, or Carnap) asked "What does this sentence mean?" they were asking how, if at all, it could be verified. But now, when Wittgenstein asked

"What does this word, or what does this proposition mean?" he claimed to be asking what could be *done* with the word or proposition in question. To ask "What does this word mean?" is very like asking a chess-player "What can I do with this piece?" I want to know what I can *do* with the word, what I can *do* with the chess-man — say, the knight. I want to know how to *use* them. In short, I want to know the rules of the game. And so a new slogan began to be bandied about the philosophical coteries of Cambridge: "Don't ask for the *meaning*; ask for the *use*." Now it is quite possible that the use of scientific statements may be to make verifiable assertions. But scientific statements are not the only kind of statement—any more than the knight is the only piece I can use in the game of chess. Similarly, it is true that proper names are used to refer to persons, places, and the like. But not all words are proper-names. And so another slogan was formulated: "Every statement has *its own* logic." And for us this is of crucial importance: for the logic of statements about God may not be the same as the logic of statements about tables, chairs, frogs, rabbits, or sputniks. When I ask for the meaning of "God" (or for the logic of sentences containing "God," I am asking: "How can I use the word 'God'? What are the rules governing the use of theological assertions?"

The old belligerance of the Vienna Circle has, then, been transmuted into a mild interrogative: should we come across a stray positivist who has not yet purchased a copy of Wittgenstein's *Investigations*, we would know how to deal with him. We must do two things: first, admit to him that we cannot offer the kind of verification he demands; then, insist that what he demands is unreasonable. We must show him that not *all* statements are used to make verifiable assertions (in his narrow sense of the term "verifiable"); and if he refuses to allow meaning to any other statements than verifiable assertions, we must show him that his theory of meaning is outmoded — must show him, in fact, that he is guilty of bigotry, conservatism, and most of the other things which he accuses *us* of.

Positivism is dead, then? Well, the old-style positivism of the Vienna Circle is dead; and yet, though itself laid peacefully to rest in the grave of the history of ideas, the verification principle is survived by a perfectly respectable grandchild, the falsification principle. A new-style positivism has taken the place of the old, and its principle of falsification is capable of being stated in a form which makes some religious statements — and these often the most fundamental — seem pointless.

II

The obvious starting-point of John Wisdom's "parable of the invisible gardener." Two people return to their long-neglected garden, and find a few of the old plants still surprisingly vigorous. One of them (we will call him the "Believer") promptly concludes that some gardener has been at work. And he refuses to abandon his conviction in spite of the obvious objections: he merely *qualifies* the conviction, never *abandons* it. If the neighbours have never seen any gardener, then he must work while others sleep. When the weeds are pointed out to him as evidence against the gardener, the Believer merely points again to the plants. Wisdom poses the question: What difference does it make then to believe in the activity of a mysterious gardener? Clearly no difference in what the positivists would call "empirical fact"—the Believer neither finds nor expects to find anything which his companion doesn't find or doesn't expect. Is the difference then just a "difference in how they feel towards the garden" — is it just a matter of what Wisdom elsewhere calls a "picture-preference"?

1. The Sceptical Reaction

The question which Wisdom poses is answered by Flew on behalf of the sceptics. The belief in God is analogous to the belief in an unseen gardener: it is not allowed to be falsifiable. So then, whilst it may be an attractive picture-preference, it cannot be a factual assertion. The principle of falsifiability holds: "An utterance is a factual assertion only if you will allow that it could be falsified." Flew goes on to offer his own illustration: confronted with the situation of a child dying from an inoperable cancer, the Christian still insists that there is a God who loves the child — only God's love is of course "not a merely human love." By some such qualification as this an attempt is made by the Believer to explain the curious fact that whilst the earthly father is driven frantic, the Heavenly Father reveals no obvious signs of concern. But the assertion of God's existence, by undergoing repeated qualifications of this kind, is in danger of becoming pointless: it is "killed by inches," as Flew puts it, it dies the "death by a thousand qualifications." In other words, it is shown to be not really an assertion at all, since nothing at all is allowed to count against it.

This is certainly a different kind of challenge from the old-fashioned demand for verification. It does not tell us (what we know perfectly well already) that religious assertions cannot be verified by sensory observations, and then go on to make the preposterous inference that

they are therefore meaningless. It tries to reduce the theistic assertion, not to "meaninglessness" in the special sense of "unverifiability" which is peculiar to the positivists, but to "pointlessness" in a sense which is both intelligible and acceptable to us all. It is not necessary on this view to begin with a theory of meaning at all — much less equate meaning, quite arbitrarily, with verification. All the critics need to extract from us is an admission that the process of qualification can be carried to a point where an alleged assertion is shown to be, in a perfectly standard sense of the word, "pointless" — if you like, "meaningless," but only in this strictly limited sense.

Flew, then, considers that the religious hypothesis should be abandoned for much the same reasons which led the scientist to abandon belief in the "ether" or in "animal spirits". They were never, strictly speaking, disproved; for, when challenged, their advocates simply introduced further qualifications: if the entities could never be seen, this meant only that they were invisible; if they could never be touched, why then they must be intangible. No, their existence was never disproved — how could it be? — but the assertion that they existed simply became pointless, of no use and of no interest to scientists — "mere idle talk," as Flew puts it. And so it is with God: we cannot disprove his existence, but to assert his existence is nevertheless pointless.

2. The Religious Reaction

From the religious side a variety of replies have been called forth by the demand for falsifiability. None of them is, I think, fully satisfying — though I have no alternative to propose.

Some of the champions of religion show themselves to be merely indifferent. Who cares? "*Of course* we can only talk nonsense when we try to talk about God . . . " Religion, as McPherson has put it, is "the inexpressible." Inevitably, we get into difficulties if we attempt to speak about the Holy. So the argument runs. But the problem is that, if we leave the problem there, we save Christianity only at the cost of letting in what J. A. Passmore has somewhere called "any sort of backyard theosophy." How are we to distinguish religious nonsense from other kinds of nonsense?

Others have tried to justify belief by insisting that the theistic assertion, though not open to testing now, will be when we are dead. But the demand for verification or falsification is here met only by surreptitiously changing the notion of verification. For even if there is an after life, and if in Paradise the moral ambiguities of our earthly existence are finally taken away, God will still be neither

visible nor touchable nor audible. The doubting Thomases would form theological discussion-groups even in Heaven. To "wait and see" may not be as conclusive as its sounds.

Yet another way to preserve the Faith is by way of attenuation. We may acknowledge that the newer positivists are victorious on their own ground, that religious statements are not falsifiable and therefore not factual assertions at all. But nevertheless they have some other valid *use*. They may, for instance, as R.B. Braithwaite has suggested, serve to promote allegiance to a certain way of life. The apparently "assertive" elements in Christian belief may be reduced to edifying stories which make the "agapeistic way of life" easier. But again the defence has obvious loopholes. Very few of us could continue to believe if we were once convinced that God, like Hamlet and Mr. Micawber, is no more than a character in a fictitious story.

A fourth suggestion comes from A. C. Ewing: it *is* possible to conceive a situation which would render the religious hypothesis unreasonable here and now. He does, in other words, allow that the theistic assertion could be falsified. The kind of situation he has in mind is one in which everyone is in intense pain all the time, everyone maliciously desiring the worst for all save himself. But if the situation had not always obtained, then the evidences would still be ambiguous; and if it had, then I do not see how a theistic belief could ever have arisen at all.

I cannot, then, leave you with the cosy feeling that, just because logical positivism has passed away, there is nothing more to be done. New linguistic critiques of religion have followed and will follow—and I am far from convinced that the new-style positivists have yet been adequately answered. In short, I cannot prescribe a very safe inoculation against the Oxford Flew. A whole host of new problems are now being raised which cry out for the attention of philosophical theologians—the relation between religious and poetic language, the nature of analogical thinking, and so on. We can hardly afford to ignore these fresh challenges. Indeed, the prospect of exploring new areas of thought should be exciting; and we should welcome the demand for greater clarity and precision in our theological work—it is not really more pious to theologise in a fog or to grace muddle-headedness with the name of "mystery." Besides (to end where we began), even British and American linguistic philosophers may have souls (who knows?), and part of our problem of communication must be how to communicate even with those whose philosophy cannot be incorporated easily into our own theological system. It should not be necessary to convert them to existentialism before trying to convert them to Christianity.

Bibliographical Note

Wisdom's celebrated parable will be found in an article entitled "Gods," reprinted in *Philosophy and Psychoanalysis* (1953) along with others of Wisdom's papers. The contributions of Flew and McPherson are made available in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (ed. by Flew and MacIntyre, 1955). For Braithwaite's views on the subject, see his excellent lecture on "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief" (published in booklet form by the Cambridge University Press, 1955). A C. Ewing's "Religious Assertions in the Light of Contemporary Philosophy" is in *Philosophy* (July, 1957).

Three recent symposia are indispensable to anyone who wants to know what else is going on in British philosophical theology besides the falsification controversy: *The Nature of Metaphysics* (ed. by D. F. Pears), *Metaphysical Beliefs* (ed. by Macintyre), and *Faith and Logic* (ed. by Basil Mitchell)—all published in 1957. The philosophical background to these discussions has been set out very recently in several good treatises. *The Revolution in Philosophy* (talks by Ayer *et al.* delivered on the notorious "Third Programme" of the B. B. C.) is the shortest and most simple. More detailed are Urmson's *Philosophical Analysis* (1956), J. A. Passmore's *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (1957), and *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century* (ed. by C. A. Mace, 1957). The last-named has an excellent chapter on "The Theory of Meaning" by Gilbert Ryle.

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Science, Values And Christian Faith

John A. Hutchison

One of the greatest achievements of the modern West — the culture of which we are members — is the creation of science. To be sure, we have not yet understood our creation, and we have not yet learned to live with it. But for better and for worse, science is a fact, and the period of history we like to call the modern world (roughly from 1500 A.D. to the present or to the recent past) will be remembered for this fact.

In the task of learning to understand science and to live with it, I believe Christian faith has important work to do. For science presents itself to us in this troubled time of Sputniks, H bombs and ICBM's as a new tool or instrument of vast and frightening power. Like any tool it can be used for good or evil, according to the purposes and wisdom of the men who use it. The important thing to note is that the new tool does not come packed with moral and social directions for its use. To be sure, there are a few suggestions arising from the humanitarian impulses and inhibitions of decent men who happen also to be scientists. But the plain fact is that no existing structure of scientific knowledge contains any moral or social imperatives to guide the human use of science, nor are any such imperatives inferrable from any statements of science. Those who believe otherwise are invited to produce such an imperative and show its relation to any existing body of scientific knowledge.

Our problem then, humanly speaking, is to understand both the possibilities and limitations of this great new tool — to see the jobs which it can do for us and those which it cannot — so that we may use it wisely and not foolishly. Then we must actually seek such humane uses of science. To put the task in Christian terms, we must seek a Christian understanding and use of science, before the misunderstanding and misuse of science nullifies and destroys humanity.

I

But what now *is* science? The heart of science is not any particular theory or achievement but rather *a continuing method and attitude.* It is not Sputnik or the Einstein theory but rather a highly distinctive method for acquiring and testing knowledge about carefully specified aspects of the objective world. And it is the tradition and community of men in which this method is practiced, developed and passed on to future generations. It is this method and attitude which lie behind all particular theories and results — and all the future theories and achievements we may expect as long as men aspire to push back the frontier of scientific knowledge.

Perhaps the most basic element of scientific method is a peculiar relation between theory, hypothesis or idea on the one hand, and fact on the other. As Mr. Conant has suggested, science is a method of knowing in which ideas are drawn from certain facts and referred successively in turn to other bodies of facts. It is important to note the particular and delimited character of the body of facts from which scientific ideas are derived and to which they are referred. Science makes no assertions about *all* facts, or the scheme of things entire. The unrestricted use of the term "all" does not occur in scientific statements.

Like an airplane, scientific method takes off from the solid earth of a specific group of facts, ascending into the world of hypothesis, theory or imagination. But what has made the fortune of modern scientific knowledge is that like an airplane it descends again to the solid earth of fact. And like an airplane it is forever landing on different airfields from those from which it took off. Or to change the metaphor, science is a never-ending game of leap frog between facts and ideas. It is this feature of scientific method which creates the distinctively progressive character of scientific knowledge.

This aspect of scientific method also implies a rigorous and never-ending criticism of all specific scientific results. This criticism is facilitated by the social device of publication. To publish a paper is to invite criticism. The scientific enterprise accordingly involves a community of free enquiry and criticism; it both depends upon and in turn encourages intellectual freedom in individuals and society.

Science is thus in a sense *a tradition and community of men thinking.* And a great tradition and community it is. From its origin in the work of men like Galileo, Newton, Darwin and Einstein, it extends to countless workers, known and unknown, in laboratories and classrooms in all parts of the world. Into this tradition and community the student makes his way by the discipline and apprenticeship of scientific study.

Every community and tradition has a master loyalty of faith which gives it unity and direction. The master loyalty or ultimate concern of the scientific tradition and community is truth. To the pursuit of truth the scientist is committed. If he fails in this pursuit, subordinating or sacrificing this value to any other, he fails as a scientist. To be sure, this valuation is not a part or aspect of any of the sciences. It is rather the *faith* of the scientist. It is not an unfair or misleading statement to say that Truth is the scientist's God. As Karl Polanyi has pointed out, an act of devotion and commitment is implied at the foundation of the scientific community, though many members of the community may not be clearly or explicitly aware of this act or of its authentically religious character.

Now the scientific method and attitude have been enormously productive. They have made a powerful impact on every aspect of human life and culture—from the ideas and images in our minds to the clothes we wear and the cars and airplanes we ride in. Science has turned its telescope on outer space and its electron microscope on the world of the atom, and, as a result, man's picture of the world in which he lives has been radically transformed; and it continues to be transformed again and again.

II

The practical impact of science has been as important as its theoretical results. As a result of science, and of its brawny child, technology, the earth can sustain a larger population in better health and welfare than in any pre-scientific age. Science has also brought into being new possibilities of human communication, undreamt of in pre-scientific days.

But with new opportunities have come new and ever-mounting problems and perils as well. The new scientific instruments and ideas do not themselves guarantee worthwhile and humane application. Indeed the radical disproportion between magnificent instrumentalities and trivial or vicious goals is a fair statement of the problem of our culture. This is not a scientific problem, but a human problem of a scientific and technical culture.

The most obvious illustration of this bitter contradiction is scientific warfare. But closely related to this is the vast and increasing number of devices and techniques facilitating the physical and mental control of human beings, thus making tyranny more total and more horrible than pre-scientific ages could imagine. On the other side of the Iron Curtain such instrumentalities often function in brutally repressive fashion. In the democracies we are kinder. We do not grind the face

off men; we *condition it off* by the softer techniques of the advertiser and the public relations man. But the result is the same, namely the depersonalization and dehumanization of man which is so vast and tragic a fact in our age.

Another kind of problem is the excessive and irrelevant hopes raised by the advances of science. Science has actually solved many tragic human problems, ranging from poliomyelitis to soil erosion, or to an adequate supply of economical physical power. It is a tempting and seductive thought to infer from these impressive victories that if only we apply scientific methods to the human problems of economic and political relations they too may similarly be solved. It is, in short, all too easy to convert a successful method into a new Savior or Messiah which will save us from all ills and bring us at length into a world of peace and brotherhood.

Such thinking overlooks a fundamental distinction between the kinds of problems which men face — the specific, limited, objective problems on which science has been so successful, and those deeper, more inward, more persistent and more elusive problems of the human spirit — perennial problems which slip through scientific method like water through a sieve.

It is the beginning of folly and illusion to confuse these two kinds of problems. So, for example, we dream of a scientific society where men will no longer have to struggle with the problems of good and evil. These illusions are particularly dangerous when they blind us to the hard facts of the situation in which we stand. Dreaming of a world of perfect peace, we stumble darkly to the threshold of universal war. Dreaming of a total welfare society, we drift toward Orwell's *1984* or Huxley's *Brave New World*. To say these things does not constitute an indictment of science but of ourselves as men. For once more science consists of morally neutral instruments of great power; and it is for us to use them for good and not for evil.

III

We are led to the thorny question of science and human value. It is a difficult question for many reasons, but first of all because the term "value" is perilously ambiguous. Let us try to fix its meaning for our discussion. A 'value' is in most general terms a human wish, desire or interest. Or it is the goal at which such an attitude impels and aims our conduct. We mean the term in a sense sufficiently broad, deep and stable to indicate the "life-values" that give direction and orientation to a man's life. In a very real sense such basic values answer the question "What is man?" for the person who holds them.

A man's personality or character is defined by his fundamental values. Used this way the term "value" is a rough contemporary equivalent of what traditional Christianity has often termed the *summum bonum* or or the "chief end of man". This modern paraphrase of traditional Christian language is fraught with peril, but it is inevitable if Christians are to maintain communication with contemporary secular thinking.

In this vein Paul Tillich has defined religious experience as ultimate concern or ultimate valuation. Such a definition points not only to communication with secular minds that think in terms of "values"; it is also a way of underscoring to religious people the fundamental fact that values lie at the heart of genuinely religious experience.

Life-values are born, developed and sustained in community and tradition. Conversely at the center of every living community and tradition lie certain basic valuations which give unity to the community and direction to the tradition. In Western culture these fundamental values are the product of Greco-Roman humanism and biblical faith. The creative moments of this cultural tradition took place in Ancient Greece, Rome and Israel. Together these impulses define the humane tradition of the West.

Accordingly, it is at least a relevant suggestion to ask if we may derive from this source the values we so sorely need to guide our use of science. The spirit in which such a suggestion is made is crucial. If the Christian says confidently and dogmatically, "We have the values essential to guide science, come to us and get them," the proposal is doomed from the outset. If, on the other hand, he says humbly and openly "I have a suggestion about the relation of science and value. Let us test it; let us try it on for size," he may receive a hearing. What follows here is a rough and brief outline of an attempt to test this suggestion at several significant points. At these points, at least, we try our hypothesis, concerning the relation of Christianity and science, on for size and find that it fits.

(1) It fits well in the instrumental view of scientific knowledge, and the means-end relation of science and religion which we have suggested in previous paragraphs. Science, we argue, is instrumental knowledge of definite fields of objects. Religious faith, by contrast, is a vital and compelling awareness of the ends of life, of the ultimate values which give human existence its meaning.

It is accordingly an elemental wisdom which enables men to distinguish and not to confuse these two functions. To give to either science or religion the role or function of the other is not only to mislead and confuse human life, but to misuse and stultify science and religion. Thus, for example, to mistake the Genesis creation story for a scientific theory concerning human and other origins is not only

intellectually repugnant (as the Fundamentalist-Modern controversy so amply shows) but religiously repugnant as well. For it radically misunderstands the authentic religious significance of this timeless story. To take the statements of this story as an explanatory theory in science is to do great violence to biblical religion.

But if it is true that religion functions ill as a science, the converse is also true. Science functions badly as a religion. If we take science not as a body of objective knowledge but as a total scheme of valuation, we covert it into a religious substitute. It is then assumed to give us orientation as well as objective knowledge. This religious substitute is often callied *scientism,* and it is a prevalent faith in the contemporary West. The point we wish here to make is that *there is no warrant in science for scientism.* Science does not ask or demand to be used in this way. Furthermore to do so results in several serious mistakes.

The votaries of scientism are often the children and grandchildren of Judeo-Christian parents. Thus they unconsciously impute to the faith of scientism the moral values which have been historically a part of Judeo-Christian faith. The usual form of this fusion is the contention that love or brotherhood is a scientific ethic. Such a view can readily be attacked from both sides — on the one hand, from the viewpoint of traditional biblical faith, and on the other, from the viewpoint of a deeper and more radical skepticism.

Another possibility latent in scientism is a *scientific* of hard, inhuman efficiency in which power or might becomes an end in itself. In this case science as a God becomes Moloch who destroys his worshippers. It is enough to note in passing the depiction of this way in *1984* and *Brave New World.* From all this we may fairly conclude that science is excellent as science but most inadequate as religion. Thus again we see the proper roles of science and religion as those of means and end.

(2) More affirmatively, science as instrumental knowledge might fulfil or realize itself in a society devoted to Christian values or goals. In such a society science could serve mankind rather than destroy mankind. Conversely, science offers to Christianity very significant new instrumentalities for the achievement of Christian ideals. New technological means of human communication are but a single illustration of the vast range of new possibilities here.

(3) A widely different facet of the problem is opened up by a look at the history of science and its relation to religion. The conventional view of this relation is that science, beginning in ancient Greece, became in later antiquity the victim of arrested development until the sixteenth and seventeenth canturies A.D. when, in the new secular freedom of the modern West, intellectual progress was resumed. The

role of Christianity in this process is assumed to be the negative one of interference, repression and obscurantism.

No candid student of these problems will wish to evade the real facts which document this last statement. It is a tragic and evil record for which Christians will do well to repent in sack cloth and ashes. But it is also pertinent to point out that it is by no means the whole story. There is another aspect of the picture which is not often seen or perceived.

IV

One can hardly imagine modern science beginning in an Oriental culture, informed and guided by such religions as Hinduism or Buddhism with their devaluation of the world of matter as mere "appearance" or "illusion". As a matter of fact Greek thought sometimes maintained a similar view, as Plato's story of the Cave amply illustrates. Indeed, Aristotle defines science as demonstratively certain deductive knowledge in which our assumptions are truer, more necessary and more general than our conclusions. It was also a highly contemplative kind of knowledge usullied by contact with time and change. Of the realm of change or becoming, there may be opinion, but not science. This was the conventional view of science until the emergence of natural science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The contrast with modern science could hardly be more extreme. The latter has lowered its sights from certainty to probability, and it is notoriously involved in matter, time and action. Furthermore, as we have previously noted, modern science is an intensely practical kind of knowledge.

How shall we understand this vast shift in viewpoint? We must beware of simple explanations of complex and difficult historical problems. But in the centuries which intervened between ancient Greece and the modern West the Bible made its impact upon the mind of Western man, seeping into the deepest parts of the human imagination, and conditioning all aspects of thought and feeling.

The Bible presents the image of the world as God's creation. This view of the world has many facets. It means that the world is an ordered structure and not chaos. It means also that the world is real and not unreal; yet it is real and *not Supreme Reality*. Similarly, creation means that the world is good and not evil; yet it is good but *not Supreme Goodness*. Creation moreover is the vineyard in which man is called to labor in the service of God.

These attitudes and teachings set the stage for the modern scientific movement. The notion that the world is not divine or "full of gods"

makes possible the emergence of a secular view of the world. The affirmative this-worldly attitude of the Bible lies behind science's interest in the world. The Genesis creation-story writer's repeated assertion that the world is "very good" is not a chance remark but an accurate expression of an important aspect of the biblical view of the world. Science seems necessarily to presuppose such a view of the reality and goodness of the world. Science must assume the world to be real enough and good enough to render significant the scientific enterprise of exploring its manifold secrets.

Scientific knowledge also emphasizes action at several points and in several ways. Knowing, for science, is not just a passive and neutral registering of impressions. Rather the scientist puts a finger into nature and does something in his experiments. Again, even more importantly, science exists not as an end in itself but as a guide to action. Such a view of knowledge fits extremely well with Biblical religion whose normative metaphor is not to see or contemplate God but to hear and do the will of God. In such ways as these the impact of the Bible may be seen upon modern science.

There are doubtless other significant points at which we must test our theory of the relation of Christian faith and science. The biblical idea of vocation, for example, may help to illuminate the action of the dedicated scientist as he goes about his work. But surely the areas which we have briefly explored here are sufficient to establish the view we have proposed as worthy of serious consideration and hence of further analysis. Science and Christian faith, once more, are related as knowledge of means and vision of the ends or goals of life. From Christian faith, wisely considered, we may derive adequate guidance to use science well and not ill.

Principalities and Powers and the Christian Ethic

David Little

The critical problem faced by Christian ethics today is illustrated by a passage from Alexander Miller's book, *The Renewal of Man, A Twentieth Century Essay on Justification by Faith.* "The characteristic political questions involve technical judgments on which there is no ground for supposing that Christian men will agree. The characteristic political questions do not arise within the Christian community but in the human community. Political questions—concerning bread and freedom, education and sanitation—are human problems and not Christian problems; but just because they *are* human problems they are of endless and costly concern to Christian men. But as we work out our obligation in these typical political areas, there is no peculiar form of Christian duty, but only a peculiar Christian urgency to do our human duty well." (pp. 116-7) This passage points up well the attitude of one branch of enlightened Christian thought. The argument runs that the Bible presents a profound analysis of human nature and the true hope for human salvation. It also calls man to a life of obedience, not to himself, but to Jesus Christ. However, the argument goes on, the Bible is of almost no value in spelling out concretely just what obedience to Christ is. The Christian continues to live in a complex and sinful society far different from that of the Biblical writers, and consequently their ethical imperatives are quite irrelevant to Twentieth century man. What has the New Testament to say to the involved problems of unemployment and inflation, of international diplomacy and cold wars?

Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr has said much recently, both in writing (e.g., *The Christian Century,* April 10, 1957, pp. 454-5) and in lectures and conversations, about the need for an "ethics of common sense." He is attracted to an ethics of *discriminate reason* generally available to most men of good-will, and thereby he hopes to compensate for the paucity of New Testament ethical guidance. To be sure, the Chrisitan is encouraged by his faith to perform his rationally conceived human duties enthusiastically, but they always remain *rationally conceived* human

duties. The Christian now stands on common ground with ethicists of every persuasion; he becomes a *moral philosopher.*

If we are forced to accept the conclusions of Dr. Miller and Dr. Niebuhr, not to mention a whole host of other enlightened Protestant thinkers, the term "Christian" ethics becomes virtually meaningless. We must take up afresh the discussion of philosophical ethics in order to find out precisely *what* our human duty is. How shall we define "common sense" specifically, and by what criterion shall we choose between this and that ethical decision? Aware, then, that our ethical quest is couched in a framework of "Christian" ends and understanding, we shall, for the time being, have to discover some "interim" rational ethic.

The Indicative and the Imperative

However, there are a few problems. The New Testament (not to mention the Old) speaks at length about ethics in an embarrassingly concrete way. In fact, it is quite obvious that in the Bible the transforming Word of God which judges and redeems man in Christ (the *Indicative*) is inextricably bound up with God's call to concrete ethical activity (the *Imperative*). The relation of what God has done, and therefore what we must do, finds its most pointed expression in Paul, though currents of the same thing can be found in the Old Testament and the remainder of the New. In Romans 6: 10-13 Paul brings into inseparable relation the *Indicative* and the *Imperative.* "The death he [Christ] died he died to sin, once for all, but the life he lives he lives to God. So you also must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus. Let not sin *therefore* reign in your mortal bodies, to make you obey their passions. Do not yield your members to sin as instruments of wickedness. . . ." (Italics mine)

The problem with Liberal theology in regard to the Bible and ethics is that it ignores the *Indicative,* the importance of theological or doctrinal perception of what it is that must happen to man before the question of ethics can be seen in its proper context. The following passage illustrates perfectly what I mean.

> In that Epistle [Romans] he [Paul] is mainly bent, as in the Corinthian Epistles he is almost entirely bent, upon what is ethical, what has relation to conduct, and to human love and hope. He drifts into a doctrinal discussion, I had almost said a doctrinal slough, because it lies directly in his path. But he is not happy there, nor do I think that he there

shows at his best. And it is with obvious relief that he goes back to his ethical exhortation.*

True enough, Paul's concern was ethical, but is it simply a mistake that he wallowed in the 'slough of doctrinal discussion' for the first eleven chapters of Romans before devoting the last four to ethical concerns? Again, his transition in 12:1-2 is a clear example of the *Indicative-Imperative*: "Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, *that* you may prove what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect." (Italics mine)

If it is true that the Liberals erred on the side of the ~~*Indicative*~~, it is perhaps equally as true that the Christian "pragmatists" err on the side of the *Imperative*. However aware they may be for the need of some kind of ethical imperative (of which many non-Christians are also aware), they are apparently not aware of the specifically Pauline insight which binds theology and ethics together so that one cannot be mentioned without the other. They have ignored the exegetical discovery that it is precisely what God has done, is doing, and shall do in the world which has direct implication for the kind of *fruit* Christians are called to bear.

A second problem with the "pragmatist" position is the anguished paralysis it produces regarding ethical activity. Decisions are complex and entangled in self-righteousness. Moral perception becomes dulled by the "ambiguities of the sinful heart." Consequently, there is no surplus of tension between the society in which we young ministers live and the Gospel we preach. How relevant to us is Dietrich Bonhoeffer's indictment of European "Reformation Christians" for blending-in with their society: "It may be 'Reformation theology' which boldly claims the name of *theologica crucis*, and pretends to prefer to Pharisaic ostentation a modest invisibility, which in practice means conformity to the world. When that happens, the hall-mark of the Church becomes *justitia civilis* (N.B.!) instead of extraordinary visibility."†

There is a great need, then, for a reexamination of Christian ethics just because we have not really listened to the Bible, nor taken its *Imperative* seriously. Therefore, we have little that is challenging to say to the Church (and through the Church to the world). It has brought us to the point of resigned conformity in performing 'human duties' enthusiastically, of defining the Christian ethic as *justitia civilis*.

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*Percy Gardner, *The Religious Experience of St. Paul.* London: Williams & Norgate, 1913, p. 139.

†Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *The Cost of Discipleship.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957, p. 101.

Principalities and Powers and the Body of Christ

In an attempt to suggest a new direction for Christian ethics, we shall consider a central category in Paul's thought: the "principalities and powers." In the light of this category, we can see how Paul himself relates the *Indicative* and the *Imperative*. According to Paul, there is a whole realm of invisible powers above and beyond man whose power is mediated through the human "rules of this age" (I Cor. 2:8). In mysterious ways these powers stand behind what occurs in the world, and before the coming of Christ they blinded and enslaved all men to split them apart from God and from one another (Gal. 3:25-4:5). They worked against God and the climax of their rebellion was the crucifixion of Christ (I Cor. 2:8). But in the Death and Resurrection of Christ the powers were overcome, they were subjected and bound (I Cor. 8: 4-6; Gal. 4: 4-5). Whether Colossians was written by Paul or not, it certainly expresses a mature Pauline frame of reference: "For in him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or authorities . . . . For in him the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross" (Col. 1:16, 19-20). In the Cross of Christ, God makes a *public example* of the powers, thus showing them up for what they really are (Col. 2:15).

It is because of this Act of God in Christ that the Christian is no longer split apart from man and God. In the Body of Christ he may find *true* reconciliation (Col. 1:21-22). He need no longer be torn apart by the powers, for they are overcome (Rom. 8: 35-39). A New Community is announced in which Christ is truly the Head and men are truly unified (Gal. 3:27-8). The communities which rally around false powers are broken and divided, but that community which "holds fast to the Head" can find true unity where "love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness," etc. may be found. (Gal. 6:22) (See also Col. 3: 12-17.) It is precisely in this context that the Pauline *Imperative* comes into play. Paul's ethical injunctions are significantly directed *to* Christian communities, for it is only within them that Christian ethics makes any real sense. It is only there where Christ is recognized as the true Head over all things, as the One who has overcome the powers (the *Indicative*). Consequently, Paul issues his *Imperative* to unity and harmony in the community in the light of the reconciliation achieved with God in Christ. Again and again, Paul's injunctions are given in order that the Community (the Church), which was wrought out in the Cross of Christ, may be truly the Church in the present. There is neither Jew nor Greek in Christ, therefore let there not be

Jew nor Greek now! This is the *becoming what you are* which is so implicit and explicit in Paul's thought. This is the interweaving of *Indicative* and *Imperative*. "If we live by the Spirit, let us also walk by the Spirit". (Gal. 5: 25)

Christocentric Ethics

The necessity for the Imperative is so great in Paul's thought because he realized that until the end of the Age the powers continued to exercise some kind of power, and to exert certain authority over men's lives so that estrangement and division continued. Over and over Paul warns the Christians not to fall back under the sway of these false powers which really have no final authority at all but which still give the illusion of so having. (I Cor. 8: 4-6) (See also Gal. 4: 8-11) In other words, Christians must be on guard against the wiles of these deceptive powers and their ethics must be framed accordingly. There is always a tension between the Christian community and the communities of the world, for the world yet walks in the authority of powers it does not recognize to be demonic and conquered in Christ. It is significant in this regard that Paul does not recommend the abolition of slavery outside the Christian community but rather only that its divisive power be overcome. The *Imperative never proceeds but always follows the Indicative.* It is only under the Lordship of Christ that sinful divisions may really be done away with, and therefore *the Imperative is addressed to the Community*. Apparently Paul did not regard the structure of slavery itself as ultimately divisive. And yet Paul at other points did not accept uncritically the social order. He admonishes Christians not to take their disputes to be decided by the civil courts. (I Cor. 6: 3-5) Here, capitulating to the social order can have nothing but a divisive influence upon the Boby of Christ.

The *initial* thrust of Paul's ethics is toward the Body of Christ, the Christian community, because the *Imperative* can only be taken to heart where the *Indicative* is acknowledged. All his ethics are *Christocentric;* they arise out of a concern that the Body of Christ be knit together and built up until Christ comes. In standing against sexual relations with a prostitute, Paul reasons on the basis of unity with Christ and his Body. "Shall I therefore take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute?" (I Cor. 6: 15, 17-18a) Again, in giving advice to the unmarried, he admits he has no "command of the Lord", but that he can only "give an opinion as one who by the Lord's mercy is trustworthy." He derives his opinion from the

desire for "good order" within the Body under the Lordship of Christ (I Cor. 7: 35).

In the matter of eating meat offered to an idol, Paul also reasons *Christocentrically*. Though one may eat the meat because in Christ he has been freed from the rule of the false powers which govern such rites, one must be careful because of others who are weak. One has a responsibility for his fellow Christians and that responsibility is determined Christocentrically. "Thus, sinning against your brethren and wounding their conscience when it is weak, you sin against Christ." (I Cor. 8: 12) So Paul also reasons with regard to speaking in tongues (I Cor. 14: 4-5, 12) and to Communion. (I Cor. 11: 17-26)

The centrality of the Body of Christ in Paul's ethical thinking is illustrated conclusively in the following passages: "All things are lawful, but not all things build up." (I Cor. 10: 23; note the words "build up"). "So whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, *do all to the glory of God*. Give no offense to Jews or to Greeks *or to the Church of God* . . . Be imitators of me, *as I am of Christ*." (I Cor. 10: 31-32, 11: 1; Italics mine). Or again, in Romans: "He who observes the day, observes it in the honor of the Lord, He also who eats, eats in honor of the Lord. . . . None of us lives to himself, and none of us dies to himself. If we live, we live to the Lord, and if we die, we are the Lord's. . . . " (Rom. 14: 6-9)

It cannot be denied that there are ethical injunctions in Paul which seem to be more authoritative by virtue of the fact that they are based upon the teachings of Jesus, as in I Cor. 7:8. In Rom. 12: 14 he speaks on the basis of Matt. 5: 44; in 12:17 on the basis of Matt. 5: 39ff., and so forth. W. D. Davies cites many more references (cf. *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, pp. 138-40). But it can hardly be argued that Paul's primary concern was to propagate a "new torah" as such (II Cor. 3: 5-6). In each of his letters *without exception*, Paul sets his ethics in the context of what Christ has done in his Death and Resurrection. The spirit of Rom. 12: 2 is always present.

Christ and the Harmony of the Church

Paul leaves open the possibility that there will arise situations in which believers will have to reason for themselves on the basis of the Lordship of Christ over the powers and the unity and harmony of the Church. Paul does not give each community an *abstract or wooden* set of rules. He gives them guides that will realize in the present the unity accomplished by Christ in the past. It is a Christo-

centric ethic because it derives from Christ and points to him and what he has done (I Cor. 3: 11).

It cannot be denied that the imminence of the End influenced Paul's ethics to an extent. We must not overlook such passages as I Cor. 7: 29-31: "I mean, brethren, the appointed time has grown very short; from now on, let those who have wives live as though they had none. . . ." And yet, as Dr. Oscar Cullmann points out, in this passage there are implicit affirmations as well. Christians continue to marry, to weep, to rejoice, to buy. They live, therefore, neither as ascetics nor as those quite at home in the world. They live in a community which, although it is not *of* the world, is still in it.*

However, these qualifications of eschatology in no way alter the basic Christocentric method by which Paul arrives at ethical decisions. They simply serve to place his ethics in a theological framework which reaffirms the importance of the *Indicative* in his thought. The principalities and powers have been brought under subjection by the Cross of Christ, but the Christian must continue to wage a battle against them in the present in order to fulfill what has been done (Eph. 6:12). The task of the Church is constantly one of discerning the subtle rule of the principalities and powers and proclaiming Christ's victory over them. In the Cross they can be seen for what they really are. And together with this discernment and proclamation, the Church must formulate ethics that call the powers into question and point to Christ as the true power. In its war the Church must always live in eschatological hope that one Day Christ will consummate his victory which remains as yet hidden to the world (Phil. 2: 10; I Cor. 15: 24). To use Cullmann's phrase: D-Day has occurred therefore V-Day is secure. The ethics of Paul, then, are ethics of witness; they are *Imperatives* calculated to point *back* to the Act of Christ and *forward* to the consummation of that Act. They are ethics which call all men to unity and reconciliation, but they bear within themselves the assertion that only in the Body of Christ (which is a foreshadowing of the New Creation) can this unity and reconciliation be found.

The Christian is called upon not to withdraw into some little isolated community which lives unto itself, but with Paul "to become all things to all men, that it might by all means save some" (I Cor. 9: 22b). The Christian must return under the powers, knowing that they are defeated and that he is free from them, in order to witness against them and to hold up the Body of Christ. Paul regarded the Law as one of the powers of destruction insofar as it held itself up as God (Rom. 7: 5-6, 15-20ff., Gal. 4: 3-5). And yet, says he, "To those under the law I became as one under the law—though not being myself under the

*Oscar Cullmann, *The Early Church*. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1956, p. 197-8.

law—that I might win those under the law . . . ." (I Cor. 9: 20b) This ethical task of the Church is in no sense easy, but rather it involves profound suffering alleviated only by the hope of V-Day (Rom. 8: 22-23; Col. 1: 24).

Relevance of Paul's Ethic

What is the relevance of Paul's *ethics of the Body* to the task of the contemporary Church? Just as proclamation of the *Indicative* (victory in Christ over the divisions wrought by the powers) is the function of the Christian Church, so also its function is the proclamation and realization of the *Imperative* (the necessity to fulfill the unity in the present which has been accomplished in the past). *The Indicative must always point to the Imperative and the Imperative to the Indicative.*

For Paul the *Imperative* was necessary precisely because Christians lived in a world which, though passing away, still gave allegiance to the powers as gods. In other words, Christians still stood within range of the temptation of the powers. The same is true today. The Christian lives in a world where corporate "powers" still claim the whole-hearted allegiance of men, powers which still create hostility and disunity between man and God and man and man. Contemporary sociology tells us at great length of the "powers" which shape our lives: of the business corporation that determines the values and mentality of its young employees (*The Organization Man*); of the society whose value-structure twists the hearts and minds of its juveniles (*The Juvenile in Delinquent Society*); of an American people whose goals and ethics are determined by the "group," so that "conformity" and "adjustment" become key-words (*The Lonely Crowd*); of the white collar "class" whose members, their work robbed of significance and meaning, are shaped and moulded by apathy, indifference and pettiness. (*The White Collar*). There are other "powers", other brands of "corporate evil": racism, economic systems whose values and mentality do not unify but divide, and deified political "powers." These "powers", when they are allowed to replace God, blind and enslave man and seduce him into false communities; they estrange and make hostile.

Just as for Paul, for us the Cross of Christ continues to "disarm" and "display publicly" the principalities and powers. Just as for Paul, for us the Body of Christ is the symbol of the broken body of mankind made whole in the Resurrection. And, like Paul, it is upon what God has done in Christ that the Church must build its ethic. Constantly, it must feel the burning *Imperative* to witness concretely in the present to the triumph of Christ in the past. The *Imperative* will again and

again call the Church to be free of the economic and social and racial "powers" that tear it apart. It will call the Church to true unity under, and on the basis of, the Lordship of Christ. There will be no place for the "wealthy church", the "inner-city church", the "middle class" church, just as there is no place for the Negro church, the Puerto Rican church or the white church. The same is true with different national churches. Just as the question of wealth and race must be rigorously examined insofar as they tear the Church apart, so the question of national conflict and division must be examined from the point of view of the unity of the Body of Christ.

When the Church finds its members caught in the service of "powers" and therefore finds itself mindlessly divided, it must truly suffer and hasten to remind itself *concretely* of its unity in the Body of the Lord. There can be no eternal absolutes handed down for every situation for the same reason that Paul issued no absolutes. That which is authoritative for ethical thinking is— as it was for Paul—*the unity of the Body of Christ.*

Also, the Church must do much exploration in the realm of *communal disciplines.* The local church must ever be aware of the necessity to behave specifically as a body—in worship, study, economic affairs, and so on.

A Church Ethic of Witness

The Christian ethic, then, is a *Church ethic.* It concerns that community where Christ is recognized as Lord. And it affects the world only insofar as it witnesses against secular divisions which tear apart the Church. But it may *not* become a little isolated community precisely because it is the Body to which all men are called and in which they may find life. The Church must ever strive to show itself as the true community of mankind standing in the midst of the broken communities of the world. Its members, therefore, must literally return under the powers witnessing to their demonism by whatever activity possible. The Church must ever witness again to those divisions in the world which try to split the Body, and it must build its social ethics, politically and economically, that those divisions might be overcome. *But,* its *Imperatives* must always point to the *Indicative* of Christ and therefore to His Body as the only context in which the *Imperatives* may truly be fulfilled.

This is a Church ethic of witness. Its point is not to "perfect" the world (there is One alone Who can do that), but it is so to live that the Body of Christ—as broken and made whole—may be held up. If we

are to take Paul seriously at all, the true Lordship of Christ over the powers points inevitably to some kind of ethics of the Body. But these ethics, profoundly conceived, also point to the Lordship of Christ.

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The Significance of Adolf von Harnack's Interpretation of Church History

Wilhelm Pauck

Harnack died in 1930. He had dominated the scene of Protestant theological scholarship for almost half a century. His numerous works on the history of Christian doctrine were believed to represent the high point of Christian historiography. His leadership reached into the life of the churches and of civilization in general not only through his own achievements but also through the influence of numerous scholars and prominent clergymen who had been his students and who carried on his work in line with the methods he had developed.

But during the period between the two World Wars he was gradually forgotten and, if not forgotten, by-passed. The theological liberalism of which he had been the outstanding representative fell into eclipse. Many of the criticisms which were directed against liberalism were not relevant to Harnack's historical labors, but they became common enough to cause his work to be neglected. The study of church history, and particularly of the history of doctrine which, for several decades, had shaped the outlook and character of Protestant theological scholarship was pushed aside by new interests in Biblical and dogmatic theology and by a profound concern for the Christian criticism of the spirit of modern civilization. The Barthian theology now dominated the theological discussion, even where it was not accepted fully or where it was not rightly understood. In his "Church Dogmatics," Barth, who once had sat at Harnack's feet as a student, chose to ignore the methods and results of the work of the teacher and his "school." Today, many contemporary theologians, even though they themselves are not Barth-

ians, proceed along the same way. It is no longer fashionable to read Harnack.

But, nevertheless, his achievements remain unsurpassed. There is still no work on the history of doctrine that has replaced his "History of Dogma." Wherever Christianity, and especially its doctrines, are studied historically, the accomplishments of Harnack and other scholars of his generation are found to set the stage for all new efforts.

We are here interested not primarily in Harnack's contribution to church historical knowledge but in his conception and interpretation of Christianity as an historical phenomenon. The results of his research on the history of the ancient church may today be unduly neglected, but they cannot but come into their own wherever and whenever scholarship turns to the fields which he chiefly explored.

It is his approach to Christianity as a living historical faith which needs to be freshly understood and re-evaluated, because the major trend of contemporary theological though is marked by a blindness for those ways of thinking which Harnack practiced not only in his historiography but also in his judgment of the validity of the Christian faith. We therefore direct our attention to his insistence that Christianity must be understood as an historical movement and that it must be interpreted by the historical method.

I

In difference from most historians, Harnack disclosed his conception of the nature of history not only implicitly in his works but also explicitly in occasional essays and addresses. In one of these, he says: "Man is in the world in order to act in it, not in order to contemplate upon it."[1] This sentence provides a clue to his understanding of history. He believed that men study history "in order to gain an insight into the material and spiritual structure of past life," and in order "to know it as the progressive concretion of the spirit and therefore as the progressive human control of the material circumstances of life."[2] The "structure of past life" and the "concretion of the spirit" are evidenced in the institutions which mankind has produced. In them the achievements of the generations live on. The historian is therefore chiefly concerned with the social and political order, codes and traditions of law, schools, churches and cultural institutions. Because they are produced by ideas and their history is the history of the mind, they can be

1. "Über die Sicherheit und die Grenzen geschichtlicher Erkenntnis" in *Erforschtes und Erlebtes* (*Reden und Aufsätze*, Neue Folge, vol. IV; Giessen: Töpelmann, 1923), p. 5. (The translation of this and all following quotations from Harnack's writing is mine.)
2. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

understood and judged. For the historian must proceed on the assumption that "it is always one and the same mind that is at work in the products of history and in us" and that "there is a unity in all happenings and in our own higher life."[3]

In every present men find themselves confronted by the task of dealing with the cultural heritage which they have inherited from their ancestors. They must appropriate it for themselves and make it their own in order to fit it into their own lives and in order to relate it to the values which they desire to embody in civilization. In this undertaking they may be confident that, in the midst of new inward and outward occasions and despite the changes and novelties that ongoing life continually produces, they must look for the same spiritual resources on which their ancestors relied and on which their children will find themselves dependent. The way in which men find themselves situated in the world is, in the last resort, the same. Wherever they are they must act toward themselves, their fellow men and their world in terms of that freedom which is the main characteristic of the mind; they must act according to the standard of values which is contained in the meaning and purpose of life as they see it. So acting they produce institutions of human culture. In their relation to these institutions the generations are linked with one another. The concretion of the mind and the actualization of human freedom take place on the scene of history where men transform the heritage of the past according to their needs and insights in order to transmit it, thus transformed, to their children. Historical knowledge is therefore not merely a knowledge of past events as such but it is an unavoidable exercise of cultural responsibility. It is the effort to understand the cultural institutions produced by past generations as they surround and condition the life of the individuals and groups of every present.

That some such view as this was Harnack's is proved by the fact that, despite his tendency to view history as a process in which the mind progressively objectifies itself or becomes concrete (in this he was under the influence of Hegelian thought), he did not believe in a continuous progress in history.[4] He was too profoundly aware of the involvement of human action in the "process" of history; men may make wrong decisions about their cultural heritage and destroy it. The question even loomed up in his mind whether mankind would possibly relapse by way of barbarism to the stage of primitivism.[5] He found himself unable to answer the question on the basis of his

3. "Was hat die Historie an fester Erkenntnis zur Deutung der Weltgeschichte zu bieten," *ibid.*, p. 187 f.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
5. *Loc. Cit.*

knowledge of history, but it must have troubled him or else he would not have raised it.

The following statement sums up his basic view:

> "We study history in order to intervene in the course of history and we have a right and duty to do so; for without historical insight we either permit ourselves to be mere objects of the historical process or tend to mislead people in an irresponsible way.
> To intervene in history—this means that we must reject the past when it reaches into the present only in order to block us. This means also that we must do the right thing in the present, *i.e.* to anticipate the future and to be prepared for it in a circumspect manner. There is no doubt that, with respect to the past, the historian assumes the royal function of a judge, for in order to decide what of the past shall continue to be effective and what must be done away with or transformed, the historian must judge like a king. Everything must be designed to furnish a preparation for the future, for only that discipline of learning has a right to exist which lays the foundations for what is to be."[6]

These strong and forthright sentences show how deeply Harnack felt that historical knowledge (primarily that of the professional historian but also that of every culturally responsible person) must serve as an instrument of action in the present. It must not be pursued for its own sake (i.e. to increase and enrich our information about the events of the past) but in order to prepare us for action in the present that is free both toward the past and the future.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that, in his funeral oration for his colleague and friend Ernst Troeltsch who had consumed himself in his last years in an effort to understand and to explain the nature of history, Harnack quoted the words with which Troeltsch concluded his volume on "Historism." After having made a fervent plea to historical scholars for the achievement of a cultural synthesis in which the historical heritage of the West must be explained in terms of its relevance to the present crisis of civilization, Troeltsch had said:

> "Only believing and bold men are able to perform the great task to formulate a new philosophy of history—skeptics or mystics, rationalistic fanatics or omniscient historians are incapable of fulfilling it . . . Reconstruction can be achieved only by someone who dares to overcome history by history in order thus to build a platform for new productive action."[7]

The phrase "to overcome history by history," *i.e.*, to act with cultural responsibility in the present in terms of a criticism of the historical

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6. Über die Sicherheit und Grenzen etc., *ibid.*, p. 7.
7. Ernst Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (= *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. III). Tübingen: Mohr, 1922, p. 771 f.

heritage, appealed to Harnack. After quoting Troeltsch, he continued: "How often did he tell me in our conversations: One must overcome history by history, *i.e.* one must accept his destiny, love it and transform it into something better. What one's goal is to be and how one is to reach it is implied in this historical attitude."[8]

Such a conception of the nature of historical knowledge must necessarily involve also a judgment on historical method. In his own historiographical work, Harnack excelled by his concern for the strict reliability of his sources. He was always in search of new or hitherto neglected material, and he endeavored to base the story he told on as full and many-sided a command of the relevant facts as he could obtain. He inspired and led a whole corps of philologically trained historians in the work of producing, if possible, definitive editions of the works of the Church Fathers. But he was also aware of the limits of historical factualness. He was mindful of the truth of a saying of Epictetus: "It is not events and facts but the manner of dealing with facts and events that people find exciting."[9] He knew therefore that the writing of history must be much more than exact research in facts and events: it must also be a demonstration of the inner structure and coherence of the facts based on a deep and rich wisdom of life and on many-sided experience.[10] The telling of the story of the past must be an art in the practice of which the wisdom and judgment of the historian is as important as the accuracy of his knowledge of the events with which he deals. There are frequent references in Harnack's writings to the old adage: *Historia quo accuratius eo falsius narratur*[11] (History assumes the character of falseness according to the degree of accuracy in which it tells of all circumstances and motives). Moreover, he gave evidence of some agreement with the views of Goethe who is reported to have said in a conversation with the historian Luden of the University of Jena in 1806: "Not all that is presented to us as history has really happened; and what has really happened did not really happen the way it was presented to us; moreover, what has really happened is only a small part of all that has happened. Everything in history remains uncertain, the largest as well as the smallest."[12]

Harnack's confidence in the reliability of the reports given by historians concerning past events certainly was greater than Goethe's but, nevertheless, his own voluminous writings show that he was concerned

8. "Gedenkrede auf Ernst Troeltsch" in *Erforschtes und Erlebtes*, p. 365.
9. "Uber die Sicherheit etc.," *ibid.*, p. 12.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
11. "Was hat die Historie etc., *ibid.*, p. 173.
12. Quoted by Harnack in his lecture on "Die Religion Goethes in der Epoche seiner Vollendung," *ibid.*, p. 157.

about history not in order to be able to tell what really happened at some time but in order to understand the historical heritage that connects the present with the past, to know how it developed and how it shaped the destinies of the generations that came under its sway, and finally to assess its value for the present.

II

We now go on to inquire how this view of history and historical knowledge is reflected in Harnack's interpretation of Christianity. One of his most telling and characteristic judgments is to be found in his last great work on Marcion.[13] At the end of a full treatment of Marcion, in which all available sources are carefully and critically used, he discusses Marcion's conception of Christianity in the light of church history. He raises the question whether Marcion was right in rejecting the authority of the Old Testament because he saw in it another religiousness than that which he found in the gospel or whether the Church was right in regarding also the Old Testament as Holy Scripture. Then he advances the following thesis:

> "The rejection of the Old Testament in the second century was a mistake which the great Church rightly refused to commit; its retention in the sixteenth century was due to the power of a fateful heritage from which the Reformers were not yet able to withdraw; but its conservation as a canonical book in modern Protestantism is the result of a paralysis of religion and of the church."[14]

This, I say, is one of Harnack's characteristic historical judgments. It shows what he meant by the statement that history must be overcome by history—and how the meaning and intent of this statement must be applied to the interpretation of Christianity: an historical heritage is not to be preserved merely on account of its historical givenness; it must be evaluated in terms of the decisions which the generations to whom it has been delivered have to make about its validity in the light of their understanding of the truth. Had the ancient church followed Marcion, it would have had to adopt his argument that the religion of the Old Testament was the worship of a false God (for it was only by an absolute distinction between truth and falsehood that differences between religions could then be explained), and the results would have been a tremendous confusion, because by a rejection of the Old Testament the Christian religion would have been placed in an historical vacuum. It was therefore a right judgment of the ancient church to affirm the canon-

13. A. Harnack, *Marcion*. Das Evangelium vom fremden Gott. 2nd ed. Leipzig Hinrichs, 1924.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

icity of the Old Testament, although this doctrine continuously involved it in a tortuous treatment of the historical nature of the religion of old Israel.

After centuries, Luther was once more led to see the profound religious difference between the law and the gospel and between the religion of the Old Testament and that of the New Testament. His insight expressed in the setence: "*Lex non potest nobis monstrare verum deum*" should have led him to dissolve the canonicity of the Old Testament, but he was religiously so deeply bound to the age-old theological tradition in which the Old Testament was Holy Scripture, and, moreover, his historical sense was so little developed that he was unable to make the necessary decision. It was only when the Enlightenment undertook an historical comparison of the religions of mankind and when the modern philosophers formulated a philosophy of history which permitted them to see that truth too undergoes a development, at least in connection with the historical forms in which it is held and expressed, that it was possible to see the impermissibility of putting the authority of the Old Testament on an equal footing with that of the New Testament. Following the leadership of Schleiermacher, Protestantism should then have rejected the canonicity of the Old Testament, especially in view of the fact that the modern historical studies of the origins of the Christian religion showed that the evolution and nature of Christianity cannot be historically understood except on the basis, and against the background, of the Old Testament. But lack of religious creativity and the lameness of ecclesiastical institutionalism deprived the Protestant churches of the ability to decide that, though it must at all times be good and useful for Christians to read the Old Testament, this book should not be given canonical authority in Christianity.

This treatment of a particular historical problem of Christianity gives us a telling clue to Harnack's historical interpretation of Christianity. He saw the Christian religion in the totality of its historical forms and expressions and he conceived it as his task to understand how these forms developed. Specializing in the study of the history of dogma, he was aware of the fact that the preservation of the dogma and its ever new interpretation was due chiefly to the living work of individual men and their total and specific, primarily spiritual concerns. But he knew also that, like everything that is part of the heritage of human civilization, the Christian dogma developed according to what he called "an inner logic of its own."[15] In his own treatment of it, he therefore took full account not only of the original creativity of the individual dogmatic thinkers but also of the complexity of the factors

15. A. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte.* 5th ed. Tübingen: Mohn, 1931-32.

in which this inner logic of the dogma expressed itself, namely: 1) the concepts and sayings contained in the canonical Scriptures; 2) the doctrinal tradition produced in an earlier period of the church and carried over to a later one without being clearly understood by its contemporaries; 3) the effort to interpret religious teachings in terms of the prevailing knowledge; 4) the requirements of ecclesiastical liturgy and polity; 5) political and social conditions; 6) changing moral ideals; 7) the tendency to interpret one doctrine according to the scheme of another one in terms of abstract analogical thought; 8) the interest to state definitively why a doctrine held to be erroneous must be rejected; 9) the hallowing power of blindly accepted customs and traditions.[16] Yet awareness of all this, which, when told as the detailed historical story, required, indeed, accurate scholarly knowledge, wide experience and profound wisdom, was regarded by him only as the preparation for the historical understanding of the nature of Christianity. This understanding, he believed, can be accomplished only if one frees the characteristic and unique substance of the Christian religion from its temporal forms and expressions.[17] This means that mindful of the totality of the historical manifestations of Christianity in specific Christian beliefs, doctrines, or practices, one must distinguish (here I use terms which Harnack did not employ) between the Christian principle and its historical forms of expression on the presupposition that, though one cannot say anything at all about the nature of Christianity except in terms of historical evidence, no historical form can fully or definitely represent it. This is, I take it, what Harnack meant when, in defending his treatment of the nature of Christianity in his famous lectures on "What is Christianity?", he said: "One may say that Paul or Augustine or Luther were right (in their conception of the Christian gospel), yet one must never go so far as to regard their Christianity as Christianity itself."[18] No historical form of Christianity must be absolutized or regarded as normative or authoritative. Instead we must recognize that though we cannot be Christians except through the medium of concrete historical traditions, it is not these traditions but their ultimate historical source that can be the fountain of Christian faith and life, namely the gospel of Jesus Christ. Where the gospel as Jesus proclaimed it, is,believer, there is Christianity, and this gospel does not require a normative historical form (in doctrine, dogma, liturgy, church polity, etc.) in order to produce belief. Many historical forms in which it has been held, beginning with the earliest, that of so-called

16. *Loc. cit.*
17. A. Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums.* 50th anniversary ed. Stuttgart: Klotz, 1950, p. XIX.
18. *Ibid.*, p. XVIII.

Jewish-Christianity, have perished, yet the gospel still finds adherents.

> "Either the gospel is . . . identified with its first form (in this case, one is forced to conclude that it came and went at a certain time), or it contains something that remains valid in historically changing forms. The latter judgment is the correct one. Even in its beginnings, the history of the church shows that it was necessary for 'early Christianity' to perish in order that 'Christianity' might remain. So too there followed, later on, one metamorphosis upon another."[19]

Harnack was convinced that the dogma (i.e. the dogma of the trinity, the dogma of the two natures of Christ, the dogma of the infallibility of the church and of the papacy, and the whole doctrinal development connected with these norms) was the product of temporal historical decisions and situations and that under its influence Christianity underwent an historical metamorphosis. The dogma must be seen (this was his thesis) "with respect to its conception and development as the work and achievement of the Greek mind on the soil of the gospel." By means of this dogma, the gospel was kept alive under specific historical conditions, namely those of the ancient Graeco-Roman world. But the gospel cannot and must not be identified with the philosophical intellectualism and with the juristic-legalistic systems which were the inevitable preconditions and products of the dogma. Indeed the gospel is not dependent upon authoritative theological doctrines and an infallible church, nor is it conceivable that any specific kind of doctrine and institution was, from the beginning, implied in its nature. This judgment, Harnack was persuaded, is both religious and historical: 1. It is religious in view of the fact that in the course of Christian history, reformations were undertaken again and again in which the gospel was set in opposition to theological and ecclesiastical traditions that were alleged to be necessary for its preservation. The successful reformations effected a critical reduction of the historical traditions. The Protestant Reformation in particular must be viewed as such a reduction; indeed, the Protestant Reformers in principle abolished the dogma. 2. The judgment is historical in the sense that the recognition of plished when in the name of the gospel they denied infallibility to any dogma. The judgment is historical in the sense that the recognition of the historical nature of Christianity which has been made possible by the humanistic-scientific revolution of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment renders an authoritarian perpetuation of the dogma impossible.

When Harnack denied the Christian validity of the dogma, he spoke as a Protestant as well as an historian. In a memorandum addressed to the Prussian Ministry of Education he wrote: ". . . . The results of

19. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

church historical research will break the power of the traditions that are now burdening the consciences of men. Cardinal Manning once made the frivolous statement: 'One must overcome history by dogma'—we say just the opposite: Dogma must be purified by history, and as Protestants we are confident that in doing so we do not break down but build up."[20]

It is often said that it was Harnack's religious and historical program to *reduce* Christianity to the religion of the historical Jesus. This is a gross over-simplification of his views. To be sure, he insisted always that in order to understand Christianity, one must see it in the light of the proclamation of Jesus and its effects and influences upon the believers. But the gospel to which he referred was something much profounder than what is commonly meant by the "religion of the historical Jesus." He believed that the saying of Matthew 11:25, "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden and I will give you rest . . ." contains the theme of all of Jesus' preaching and work. Moreover, he thought it possible to describe the gospel of Jesus in three circles of thought each of which must be understood as containing the whole of the gospel: the Kingdom of God and its coming; the faith in God the Father and the infinite value of the human soul; the better righteousness and the commandment of love.[21] Because this gospel is basically a proclamation about God that demands faith and as such moulds the way of life, he was certain that it is not an intellectual doctrine and in particular that its acceptance does not require a definite doctrine about the person of Jesus.

> "It is something exceedingly strained" (he wrote) "to maintain that even according to Jesus himself his preaching was only something provisional and that it must all be differently understood in the light of his death and resurrection. No—this proclamation of his is simpler than the churches have been willing to acknowledge it to be and it was therefore also more universal and more serious. Not the Son but the Father alone belongs in the gospel as Jesus proclaimed it. He does not belong in the gospel as one of its parts, but he was the personal concretion and power of the gospel and is still realized as such."[22]

From this understanding Harnack did not conclude that the actual development of Christianity in the form of dogma and church represents a perversion of the gospel. He did not write the *History of Dogma* in order to prove that from the beginning it was a religious error. Nor was he of the opinion that modern Christians should undertake a repristination of the religion of the New Testament in so far as one can

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20. Nov. 27, 1888. Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, *Adolf von Harnack*: 2nd ed. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1951, p. 88.
21. *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 31.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 85 f.

interpret it as focused in the historical gospel of Jesus. He was filled with a deep sense of wonder and admiration when he considered the way in which Christianity as an historical movement had survived the civilizations through which it has passed. His treatment of the expansion of Christianity in the first three centuries, his analysis of Marcion and the heresies of the second century, his interpretation of Augustine and his characterization of monasticism—they all testify to the fact that his insistence upon the historical interpretation of Christianity did not culminate in the advocacy of the normativeness of its beginnngs in the teaching of Jesus. Indeed, in contrast to many Protestant theologians and church-historians, he always regarded the Roman Catholic Church as the most impressive product of Christian history. He judged it to be "the most comprehensive and most powerful, the most complex and yet most uniform structure which history as far as we know has ever produced."[23]

But he was so deeply persuaded that the Protestant Reformation had rediscovered the *gospel* as the religious source of Christianity, and that the modern historical consciousness had made possible a liberation of the mind of men from the weight of traditions hitherto regarded as sacrosanct, that for today he urged a form of Christianity in which the gospel might find an expression transcending the authoritarianism of the tradition. He believed that thereby Christians could be led to greater religious, intellectual, and moral truthfulness. His study of the history of dogma had taught him that since an early time and certainly since the fourth or fifth century no full truthfulness had prevailed in the church, because the creeds tended to *state* more than Christians were really ready to answer for and because dogmatic formulae had become more eccentric than the real belief of Christians warranted.[24] Furthermore, he was forced to conclude that the connection of dogmatic taught with the intellectualism of Greek philosophy had put an imagined Christ in the place of the real one.[25] He confessed that his mind was filled with sadness when the history of Christianity made him see the transformation of a worship in spirit and in truth to that of signs, liturgical forms, and idols. "Jesus Christ," he wrote, "let himself be nailed to the cross in order that this kind of religion should be done away with."[26] Nevertheless, he was sure that ecclesiasticism had never succeeded in suppressing the power of the gospel,[27] indeed, that the gospel had been and still is effective in all churches in spite of the fact

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23. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
24. Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 314.
25. *Wesen d. Christent.*, p. 140.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

that it was and still is immensely burdened with foreign elements and demands.

At the end of his life he summed up his views in an exchange of letters with Professor E. Peterson, who was about to become a convert to Roman Catholicism because he had been led to think that no church could maintain the Christian witness in the confusion of modern thought unless it could rely on an authoritatively defined doctrine. Harnack denied that an ecclesiastical community required an absolute formal authority, and he asserted that real religious community was produced in Christendom at all times by the witness of experience and faith of regenerated persons and by its resonant and illuminating influence upon others.[28] In view of this, he hailed that development in Protestant church life "which points more and more toward Independentism and the pure community of spirit of the kind represented by the Quakers and by Congregationalism."[29]

One is permitted to say, I think, that this confession to the religious, confessional, and ecclesiastical freedom of the Quakers and the Congregationalists reflects the sum of Harnack's work as a church historian: Christians live by the power of the gospel for which they must find free and unauthoritarian forms in their common life according to the exigencies of everlchanging historical situations.

III

The importance of Harnack's work and outlook will be more fully recognized in the coming years than it is now. The historical interpretation of Christianity cannot, in the long run, be neglected by the churches and denominations. The time will come when, on the continent of Europe, theological scholarship and church policy will effect a return to the manner of thinking which Harnack represented. He and Troeltsch will be rediscovered and their leadership will again be recognized as promising a true and truthful understanding and interpretation of the Christian gospel in the modern world. The Barthian and neo-confessional theologies of today will then be viewed as impossible because of their neglect of the historical dimensions of the Christian faith. Whether the churches too, and particularly their official bodies, will be led to see the necessity to take account of the historical method and its impact upon the modern forms of the Christian life, is a difficult question. They never opened themselves to the kind of theological thought which Harnack's work embodies. Indeed, they refused to give him any concrete

28. "Briefwechsel mit Harnack" in Erik Peterson, *Theologische Traktate*. München: Kösel-Verlag, 1951, p. 258.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

ecclesiastical responsibility or task, despite the fact that he was acknowledged almost universally as one of the foremost representatives of Protestant theology. They never were willing to identify themselves with him. Yet it is obvious that without that self-criticism and that readiness for the re-evaluation of traditions which the practice of the historical interpretation of life requires, the churches will become more and more what they already are, namely tradition-bound institutions and ineffective vestiges of the past. As such they must unavoidably be judged as outdated by all who, in dealing with the cultural heritage, cannot but try to "overcome history by history." The ecumenical movement, too, we can be certain, will not make progress toward the realization o fthe idea of the world-church, unless the churches agree to change their outlook upon themselves and upon other churches in accordance with the historical interpretation of Christianity.

American Protestantism is on the whole less bound than European Protestantism, but the American denominations have not yet learned to understand themselves as historical movements. If they are willing to use the opportunity with which their freedom has provided them, namely to practice an *historical responsibility* toward the Christian legacy, they may become the bearers of a Christian Renaissance. In such an event, Harnack will once more come into his own.

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The Self; By Clark Moustakas, Editor, Explorations in Personal Growth, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1956.
The Religious Dimensions of Personality. By Wayne Oates, New York, The Association Press, 1957. 320 pages.

The passionate search of modern man to discover his identity—to answer the question, Who am I?, is borne in upon one who scans the field of personality theory today. The question is more than a detached inquiry concerned with whether there is an entity called the self. It is an insistent question which springs from man's commitment in life. "Is there a me?" "I want to be real!"

There are three concerns which are common to modern personality theories: 1) Since the days of Hume, who removed substance from psychology, the self is understood as a *functional entity* rather than an autonomous agent within man. It is described in empirical and phenomenological terms. 2) All personality theories are forced to deal with the crucial importance of the nature and functioning of *motivation*. Indeed, the view of motivation is in some measure a differential criterion for the philosophic framework in which the person is viewed. Between the mechanism of Freud ("the displacement of energy from one object to another is the most important feature of personality dynamics".—Hall and Lindzey, p. 39) and the teleology of Jung ("the person lives by aims as well as by causes." Ibid., p. 78) a full spectrum of attitudes toward motivation is represented. 3) Every theory of personality is also involved in a *theory about man and the meaningful context of his life*. Whether the basic model is *stimulus-response* or *gestalt-relatedness*, personality theory is based on a view of man in which his behavior makes sense.

Around these common foci—the functional, motivational and meaningful dimensions of selfhood—most personality theories are shaped.

Hall and Lindzey's monumental work in bringing together readable, comparative surveys of personality theories from Freud to Carl Rogers is of inestimable value for anyone who takes seriously the challenge of contemporary intellectual history. Freud, Jung and Adler are *both* supported *and* judged in the work of Fromm, Horney and Sullivan. Gestalt theories with an organismic basis in Goldstein, a motivational center-of-gravity in Murray and a "field of forces" focus in Kurt Lewin, are all efforts to make sense out of the complex of human interaction. With the individual psychology of Allport and the phenomenological emphasis of Rogers, there is a definite move away from man-as-seen-in-a-category to man as uniquely experienced and reported by himself. There are others. The impressive fact is that theoretical and research work as well as clinical operations are being carried out in the full vigor of the depth which man has discovered anew in our day.

Clark Moustakas has brought together a number of significant contributors who have a common concern with the growth and development of the self. Moustakas initiates the series with his own essay on "True Experience and the Self." He emphasizes the radical uniqueness of selfhood and growth. Readers of this *Quarterly* will find Andras Angyal of particular interest. For him the most adequate model of the creative tensions in the growing self is found in religious experience. Man is both a *unifier* of his own wholes and "*a participant* in the superordinate whole to which he belongs." Hence the creative tension lies between self-determination and self-surrender.

Wayne Oates includes many of the theorists represented in the first two volumes which have been noted here. He writes from the perspective of "the revelational approach to personality" by which he means to say that he views man in his wholeness as "a creature standing *in relation* before God as The Creator."

It is evident in the work of Wayne Oates that the rediscovery of man's wholeness in biblical theology—its emphasis on *nephesh* as a dynamic, actional symbol of the self—has significance for the growing conviction in psychology that man cannot be understood in a vacuum—or in a laboratory. The uniqueness of persons is discovered only in their commitments. "Man," the author writes, "from his conception to his death, experiences himself both as a *being* self and as a *becoming self* . . . " He who would understand

what it is to be a man must abandon the spectator's seat for a part in the dialogue of living.

Professor Oates has made an attempt to incorporate the work of "developmental psychology" in his synoptic view. He emphasizes the "revelatory power" of man's encounter at every stage. Eschatology has its way of shaping personal development. While it is true that every stage in man's life possesses revelatory possibility, some readers may feel that the author's desire for relevancy results in putting eschatology on a "Gesell-like" schedule! Possibly this is an unfair judgment. Oates himself writes that "to say that God *usually* manifests himself to a growing person . . . is a very different thing from saying that God *cannot* manifest himself in any other way!" The impression remains, however, that order is preferred, and, obviously, it makes the work of a Christian psychologist more manageable.

Of these three books, Wayne Oates is a must for the religious worker. His courage, his scholarship and above all his honest wrestling with these divergent disciplines—theology and psychology—are fruits of the spirit for which we can only be thankful. He is a good counselor and teacher in the way ahead.

C. R. Stinnette, Jr.

The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud. By Ernest Jones, M.D., Vol. I, 1953, Vol. II, 1955, Vol. III, 1957, New York, Basic Books.

This is the definitive critical biography of Freud and the only acceptable piece of biographical writing about the founder of psychoanalysis (with the exception of some fragmentary notes, including some of his own). Jones knew Freud during most of his life as a psychoanalyst and familiarized himself with Freud's earlier life through documents and personal communications with members of Freud's family and professional circle.

The author has not hesitated to reveal inelegant aspects of the life of the book's hero. Neither has he abstained from criticism of Freud's colleagues and opponents. At no point does the book become apologetic or polemic in thrust, although, it would be silly to suggest that writing for a field as filled with orthodox-heterodox problems as psychoanalysis can be done dispassionately. Jones has his convictions and states them. He also knows he has them and knows he states them and lets us know he knows.

As a personal biography the book could benefit from more German blood, more Jewish blood, in Jones' viens. The latter

has grasped a great deal of the life of Vienna, of the life of the Viennese Jew—but he misses out in the communication of some of the earthly Jüdischkeit, some of the absurdity and glory of the Jew in Europe that were hard for this patient English gentleman to reflect, accept as he might.

Jones reveals his own greatness as a preserver of the analytic movement through the crises of wars and clashes of temperament within the movement. He admits the importance of his role but does not exaggerate it. Peace in the English analytic movement is in dramatic contrast to American fragmentation and schism.

Perhaps of greatest interest to ministers and seminarians is Jones' treatment of the Freud-Pfister friendship and correspondence. Oskar Pfister, pastor in Zurich and training analyst, was a close and loyal friend of Freud yet one who perpetually plagued the latter with his persistent and consistent Christianity with which he insisted psychoanalysis had a creative interrelation. They (Freud and Pfister) never got together on this, but neither did they ever grow apart; a testimony to the faith and friendship of both.

Any serious student of psychology, personality, or psychoanalysis cannot afford to ignore this magnificent summary of the life and thought of Freud and his closest collaborators. Any student of the history of religion or the Church will be struck with parallels between the history of the movement and that of religious movements. Any seeker for points of contact between psychoanalysis and religion cannot find a better introduction, source book, or inspiration.

Earl A. Loomis, Jr.

Preface to Pastoral Theology. By Seward Hiltner, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1957, 240 pp.

This book by one of the recognized leaders in the field of pastoral work and counselling is properly called a "preface" to pastoral theology because Dr. Hiltner has concerned himself with the fundamental conception of the pastoral office, and with an attempt to analyze logically the relation of pastoral theology as a discipline to the whole body of divinity. He rightly says that "the conception, meaning, method, and structure of pastoral theology in Protestantism are all amorphous." With the courage to face tough technical and logical problems and a sure grasp of

the relations of pastoral theology to the field of theological study, Dr. Hiltner has produced a basic book which ought to be carefully studied by ministers and theological faculties alike. Whether one finds himself in agreement with the analysis or not is not so important as the fact that the analysis is being made.

The key concept for the unifying of pastoral functions is found in the New Testament theme of the "shepherd" of the congregation, so that *shepherding* (a less awkward term than the sometimes used *poimenics*) becomes the distinctive theme of the pastoral office. The three functions of *healing*, *sustaining*, and *guiding* are interpreted as aspects of shepherding; two cognate functions of *communicating* and *organizing* are also brought within the fundamental perspective.

Dr. Hiltner does not leave his structural pattern without concrete illustration. He makes extensive use of the case material left by Ichabod Spencer, a Presbyterian minister in Brooklyn in the 19th century. As one of the very rare examples of such extensive case material from a previous century it has its own intrinsic interest. Further development of the implications of Dr. Hiltner's point of view would, of course, demand a less restricted body of case material. But the heart of the book is the focus on the nature and structure of the pastoral office, and it is a very badly needed book indeed.

DANIEL D. WILLIAMS

Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought. By Ruth L. Munroe, New York, Dryden Press, 1955, 620 pp.

This book is "an exposition, critique, and attempt at integration" of the major schools of psychoanalytic thought by a clinical psychologist with extensive experience in diagnostic testing and guidance as well as in teaching at Sarah Lawrence and The City College of New York.

Part One (pp. 3-70) is a description of the author's approach to the study of psychoanalytic thought and an introduction to basic concepts. Parts Two and Three deal with "Freud and the 'Freudians'" (pp. 71-330) and "Adler, Horney, Fromm, and Sullivan" (pp. 333-5356) respectively. These two parts are each divided into five chapters under the following headings: The Terms of the Organism, The Terms of the Milieu, The Genetic Process, The Dynamics of the Functioning Personality, and Pathology and Treatment. This arrangement assists the reader in the

comparative study of the schools. Part Four is a briefer study of Jung and Rank. The author is less interested in, and less informed about, these two schools.

Dispersed strategically throughout the chapters are clear and precise "Critical Comments" set off from the discussion of the schools in double-column format. They are of two kinds: "Reflections of the clinical psychologist on problems of patients, normal people, our culture, and empirical research; and discussions of a philosophical order."

Part Five is an Epilogue in which the author attempts a critical summary of present psychoanalytic thought and an indication of the further investigation needed. This book is a good secondary introduction to psychoanalytic thought and, because of the critique offered by the author, a good supplement to a reading of the primary sources. It is a comprehensive, fair-minded and readable treatment of the subject.

LAWRENCE DEBOER

Motivation and Personality. By A. H. Maslow, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1954.

This book represents a distinguished effort to analyse 'normal' adult maturity. For Maslow, too much attention *in the past* has been given to human pathology, and in his opinion this has been due to the determination of scientific inquiry by the limits of traditional methods. In attempting the study of psychological health, Maslow is here trying both to present his findings and to perfect his method of inquiry. He sees the development of personality as motivated by a hierarchy of needs, some of the more basic of which become inoperative through satiation while others slowly emerge and grow in intensity. Most 'higher' needs are absent in persons suffering deprivation of basic satisfactions. Consequently, modern social science should promote the cultural development of both basic and higher need-satisfactions. He defines some of the higher needs as: "Mystic Experience, *gemeinschaftsgefühl*, profound interpersonal relations, the democratic character structure, a monistic moral sense (but not "orthodoxly religious"), and a philosophical sense of humor. Obviously, Maslow's thesis accepts the *self* as the ultimate source of motivation and phenomenal investigations as valid and essential. His book should be especially appealing to secular and religious educators.

A Professor of Psychology at Brandeis University, Maslow is a naturalistic humanist who wears his idealism proudly.

WAYNE PLUMMER

Psychotherapy and Religion. By Henry J. S. Guntrip, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957.

With this book Henry Guntrip has created a prominent place for himself among the writers on the subject of religion and psychotherapy. With his compelling, concise, and systematic defining of the role of 'values' in the healing process he has clarified both the scientific and the religious approaches to suffering. He follows the 'revisionist' trend in the Freudian tradition. The approach to the problem of 'mental pain' must integrate all our best insights from medicine, psychology and religion or morals. He begins his book with a synthesis of the two theoretical views which regard emotional stress as due to intra-psychic and interpersonal causes. With roots in both areas he then sees man growing as a loving and creative being with the assistance of both psychotherapy and religion. Yet, there is no attempted synthesis of the two disciplines. Psychotherapy leads man toward a vital consideration of life's values. Religion begins with affirmation about values. In addition, however, religious faith and experience concurrently provide the most favorable atmosphere for the therapeutic effort. Man must progress in his quest from salvation to communion. Here, then, is a rich literary contribution to one of society's major problems. Henry Guntrip, for eighteen years a Congregational minister, is a teaching psychotherapist at Leeds University, England.

WAYNE PLUMMER

Personality and Religion. By Paul E. Johnson, New York, 1957, Abingdon Press, 297 pp.

This book is excellent reading for the student of personality who desires a combination of an orientation to four major themes in personality development and some verified clinical observations. The four major themes include: 1) the personality of infancy according to Freud; 2) the personality of childhood according to Lewin; 3) the personality of youth according to Sullivan; and

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4) emerging maturity according to Allport. The four clinical observations, seriously limited by the printed page and by the religious orientation of the case studies, are of particular interest to the theological student.

The author is attempting some integration of the major influences of psychology with the awareness of self that comes to focus through a religious experience. He coins the term "dynamic interpersonalism" which demonstrates the encounter of the I-Thou relationship, and in the latter part of the book there is more reflective satisfaction for those who find the clinical limited and the theological untouchable. The theories of *becoming*, *belonging*, and *being* are scripturally substantiated.

This book comes from the vast experience of the author who has been teaching for twenty years in the field of personality and religion. He is well qualified to knit together in a book of this kind some of the frayed and misunderstood threads of psychology and religion. For further satisfaction to the student in this field, a good bibliography has been compiled along with an adequate reference index.

KEITH W. KEIDEL

Christian Essays in Psychiatry. Edited by Philip Mairet, New York Philosophical Library, 1956, 187 pp.

This is a book which will be read with profit by those who are interested in the exchange and cross-fertilization of ideas between the two great disciplines of religion and dynamic psychology. The slim volume brings together individual statements of ten British contributors, of whom seven are practicing psychiatrists, the rest theologians. The introduction points out that the book was prepared by "a group of Christian doctors who thought that a considered statement on psychiatry from a Christian standpoint was called for".

The ten essays of the volume are precise and to the point. This makes them relatively easy and profitable reading in a field where the qualities of such orderliness are often missing. If I should have to call special attention to some of them, I would first point to editor Mairet's essay on "The Presuppositions of Psychological Analysis", in which he offers an excellent exposition of the three great schools of Freud, Adler, and Jung, their principles and their attitudes toward religion. A good piece of work is also

an article by Gilbert elaborating upon some outstanding distinctions between psycho-therapeutic analysis (of the unconscious), on the one hand, and spiritual direction (of the conscious mind), on the other. Into the same context falls the contribution of the eminent Victor White O.P. (author of the book "*God and the Unconscious*), dealing with the crucial problem of "Guilt, theological and psychological". A fourth author writes intelligently on the development of religious and moral attitudes in children. Still another on "Religious symptoms in Mental Disorders". Another chapter is on the "Constitutional Approach", and examines psychological concepts on which the U.S.A. has imposed a heavy cultural taboo. All these authors, together with the rest of the contributors to the book (different individuals as they may be) have something in common. They share a more than superficial slant toward that special brand of psychology which centers around Professor C. G. Jung of Zurich.

This last remark brings me to some reservations about the book. I fear that the "Essays" are neither so encompassing in their "Psychiatry" nor so "Christian" in substance as their collective book-title would lead us to expect.

Since C. G. Jung, contrary to the other patriarchs of modern depth psychology, has never openly devaluated nor bypassed religion, some observers have held that his particular psychology may even be favorable to Christian viewpoints. This thesis, however, although seemingly accepted by the ten contributors of our essays, is very dubious. There can be no question that Jung has a genuine appreciation of the pragmatic value of religion, and we have his own pronouncement that "I have never anywhere denied God". Nevertheless, we will be on rather safe grounds when we suggest that Jung values the realm for which religion stands more as a provider of symbols and archetypes than an objective reality *per se*—and that God is for him more a necessary psychological function of man's irrational character than the living Lord of the Bible. Indeed, when one goes from general and "natural" religiosity to "Christian" religion more specifically, one cannot but agree with the flashes of insight as they appear on pages 70 and 149 of the book. There we find the idea that closed psychological systems (and this certainly includes Jung's) may be able to promise man the fullness and health of all his natural endowments, as these systems interpret them, while the salvation and wholeness which Christianity offers him could possibly subordinate such "nature" to the "Super-natural"; the self-and culture-transcending, "sanctifying" and spiritual value of the

Gospel, proclaimed once and for all.

In a recent book, the Jesuit Father Raymond Hostie has presented us with a Roman Catholic view of the topic: "Religion and The Psychology of Jung". Before we Protestants have an equally careful study, in which sympathies do not preclude good judgment, we had better be careful not to take a Jung-inspired With this warning in mind the present volume may again be recommended to all pastors who have an interest in psychology and in a modern, psychologically-oriented ministry.

E. Frederick Proelss

Understanding Grief. By Edgar N. Jackson, New York, Abingdon Press, 1957, 255 pp.

It will take some doing to produce a better book than this on the understanding of grief. We may have here another text, like Cabot and Dicks' *Art of Ministering to the Sick*, which will invite restatement and amplification at many points, but it will be for a long while the book every student is told to read first. The subtitle, "Its Roots, Dynamics, and Treatment," is accurate. Mr. Jackson writes out of sound understanding, training, and practice, and he brings together the contributions of Psychology and Theology with an overall awareness of the relevance of the Christian gospel and the distinctive task of the pastor. His approach is avowedly eclectic: in several places he has made bedfellows of writers not ordinarily associated with ease; and partisans of schools will find lots to quarrel with. He has made good use of a previously-published work on grief, and is careful to give credit where credit is due. The book is well organized, with the progression of thought clearly indicated by chapter and section headings, and with discerning but unobtrusive use of case material for illustration. The bibliography presents a good working list of the most helpful books for the pastor in both theoretical and practical aspects of the subject. A tendency to fall into jargon makes for occasional heavy going in some of the early chapters, and the insistent use of "exteriorize" for "externalize" throughout the book is a bit annoying; but these are small matters. The author's point of view may perhaps best be indicated by a sentance he quotes from Paul Irion: ". . . the Christian faith is a

resource which enables the individual to mourn, rather than a substitute for mourning" (p. 223).

R. B. Reeves, Jr.

The Meaning of Persons. By Paul Tournier, New York, Harper Brothers, 1957, 238 pp.

In this book, Dr. Tournier, a Swiss psychiatrist, attempts to explore the inner depths of man in order to uncover *self* or *person* and the means by which *self* may be made known to *self*, to others and to God. Finding *self* to be externally apparent as distorted and varied images, he learns that the essential person may be reached through sincerity of interest, and effort, which eventually lead to understanding and communion between doctor and patient, and to the apprehension of spirit in both.

To account for the inaccessibility of persons (*selfs*) to other persons, he visualizes person as submerged or hidden by a host of mechanisms or 'personages'; *person* being an inner spiritual entity observable exteriorly as a complex superstructure of personages built up in the process of living. This multiplicity of personages is fashioned by our instincts, egoisms, vanities and legitimate ambitions responding to the forces of environment in adaptive need. Consequently, man is constituted of two elements: the hidden spontaneous and spiritual (*person*) not accessible to intro-spection or observation; and the automatic, recurrent. causal (*personages*) which is accessible to observation. Thus. psychological therapy and tests are techniques by which one may ultimately reach through to inner person; and when person is reached, psychology ends and spirit begins. Once the outer shield of personage is breached by appropriate techniques, we move within the domain of person and its spiritual content—that of values, faith and decisions involving self-commitment. Hence, psychology is but a means of studying personality which lies between person and personage and comprises innate characteristics plus additions due to education and other life experiences. This double aspect of man is also characteristic of his spiritual life; hence it is present in our religious life which may also be subject to discordances between person and personages.

How, then, may the person be reached, since introspection and objective study are ineffectual? Accessibility to person is possible through its self-revelation to another person and through its ac-

ceptance of responsibility. These are achieved by means of a relationship, by communion with a second person in which, through a dialogue, personage is pierced and person reaches through to person. Thus a sense of responsibility is the condition for liberation of the person achieved through *confession* which is the core of the truly personal dialogue. The road to confession must be taken first in order to be free to speak truly, simply and personally, without which there can be no dialogue.

But in so doing, a second dialogue ensues: one with the doctor and one with God. Thus the person is simultaneously revealed to another person and to God, and another person and God reveal themselves in the confessional. The prime necessity for the "medicine of the person", therefore, is that the doctor open his heart to the world of persons and learn to see his patients not as the scene of this or that phenomenon but as persons.

The more a person opens his heart, the more important it is that he find the doctor in close contact with God. The doctor, consequently, must perform his work with his own person, not with his personages. In the dialogue which takes place between person and persons comes self-knowledge, accessibility to spirit, and sincerity in religious life.

Finally, life is choice, self-commitment and responsibility; "jumping over the hedges of the personages which have gradually grown up and hemmed us in". Risks may be involved, but the person issues forth liberated and self determining. If patients are helped to recover this fundamental function of life, namely choice, sooner or later they will raise the question of values—the dialogue will become spiritual. New life therefore comes from this encounter of person with person.

Dr. Tournier writes with the self-consciousness of the philosopher. His language is clear and direct and his orientation is toward people rather than the clinic. He draws heavily upon the thoughts and experiences of other men, upon case material and upon the experiences of his own life. In his sincerity of expression may be detected his honest effort to "scrape away the varnish of the personage to reveal once more the true colors of the person underneath".

GEORGE SHUGART

Book Reviews

THE ESSENES AND CHRISTIANITY, BY DUNCAN HOWLETT. *New York, Harper & Bros., 1957. 216 pp.,*

THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS AND THE BIBLE, BY ROLAND E. MURPHY, O. CARM., *Westminster, Maryland, The Newman Press, 1956. 119 pp., $1.50.*

THE SCROLLS AND THE NEW TESTAMENT, EDITED BY KRISTER STENDAHL. *New York, Harper & Bros., 1957. 308 pp., $4.00.*

Popular excitement over the Dead Sea Scrolls, first aroused by Edmund Wilson's famous essay in the *New Yorker* of May 11, 1955, seems to have died down. But it is well to remember that scores of scholars had long been engaged in the kind of technical studies on the scrolls which alone yield constructive and reliable results. The number of contributions now approaches the fabulous number of two thousand, all within a period of about ten years. Each of the three books under review has its special merits. Two of them are popular in the best sense of the word. The third is a collection of essays by Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant scholars both here and abroad. All but three have already appeared in scholarly journals, seven of them in German.

In eighteen brief but readable chapters Duncan Howlett, the Unitarian minister of the First Church of Boston, addresses himself to the interpretation of the scrolls. He has profited from the counsel of Krister Stendahl and Immanuel Ben Dor, both of Harvard. His book is a sober and well-reasoned attempt to understand what the scrolls have to say in their historical and theological contexts. At least one-third of his discussion is directed to discerning the relationship between the Essenes and Christianity. He allows the scrolls to bear their own witness, and he has a warm appreciation of the piety of the covenanters. The numerous similarities with New Testament life and faith are recognized, but the differences are also set forth. It is a good book.

Roland E. Murphy, Professor of Semitics at the Catholic University of America, seeks to place the scrolls in their proper literary, social, and theological setting. The necessary preliminary information is given, but not as adequately as one might wish. By far the best chapter is on the value of the scrolls for the study of the Old Testament text. His conclusions are as follows: (1) We now have another window through which to view the Hebrew text at a relatively early period of its life. (2) The O. T. text has not been seriously corrupted in the course of transmission. (3) We now have evidence of the fluidity of the Hebrew text in the period before Christ. (4) The scrolls will provide us with a number of original readings, as e.g., in I-II Samuel. (5) They tell us something of the editing of the O. T. (6) We are

receiving from the scrolls a more detailed knowledge of the origins of the Greek Septuagint. Father Murphy writes about the relation of early Christianity to its background, examines the terminology of the scrolls, and then turns to the extremely important questions of their relation to John the Baptist, the Johannine writings, the Sermon on the Mount, Acts and the Epistles, and finally to the connections between Jesus and the Teacher of Righteousness. The book is clearly and incisively written; it is discriminating and fair, an admirable corrective to speculative vagary.

Krister Stendahl, the editor of *The Scrolls and the New Testament*, establishes in a very fresh and convincing fashion the basis upon which the scrolls are to be studied in their relation to the New Testament. It is only by way of a rather elaborate critical analysis of New Testament material, he says, that a comparative study can be carried on with precision. He calls attention to the strong note of expectation and anticipation in the Qumran texts and in the New Testament; he understands the creative matrix of eschatology. He is not content with merely listing similarities and dissimilarities, but interprets both in the light of the common expectations of the Essenes and early Christians. He shows how the scrolls contribute to our knowledge of the Jewish background of Christianity. "It means, among other things, that both the Pauline and the Johannine literature can be understood in their Jewish background and that many of the odysseys of scholars some decades ago over the deep waters of Hellenistic philosophy and religion were more fascinating than they were rewarding." (p. 5) Stendahl's chapter provides an admirable setting for the chapters which follow; it should be required reading for all who venture upon the same course. He does not repeat old clichés and is not shackled by the "assured results of N. T. scholarship."

Oscar Cullmann's lecture at Union on "The Significance of the Qumran tests for Research into the Beginnings of Christianity" is appropriately included in the collection. He seeks to establish a bridge between the Essenes and the early Christians in the Hellenists of the Book of Acts and finds a common denominator in their rejection of temple worship. The development of one form of early Christianity, he suggests, is *Essenes, Christian Hellenists, Fourth Gospel.* The Synoptic and Johannine representations are both Palestinian; the latter is not later than the former but is only farther removed from normative Judaism. W. H. Brownlee of Duke writes on John the Baptist. It is a stimulating and venturesome discussion, one that has adready influenced subsequent studies, but it contains a number of rather speculative assumptions, not least of all his identification of the prophet to come with Elijah. Karl Georg Kuhn of Heidelberg, who is in many ways the foremost N.T. scholar in the particular field, is represented by three chapters: on the two messiahs of Aaron and Israel, on the sacred meal, and on temptation, sin and flesh in the N.T. These are masterly discussions, which reveal not only linguistic expertness, sound critical methodology, and "cultural" understanding but also theological insight and a capacity for discerning distinctions and nuances. They are among the most important contributions in the book. Sherman Johnson of the Church Divinity School of the Pacific writes on the Dead Sea Manual of Discipline and the Jerusalem Church of Acts. It is a thoroughly independent study, careful and constructive, and in many ways casts fresh light upon the early Christian community. W. D. Davies of Princeton gives us a superb study of Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Flesh and Spirit. Davies has a rare ability to penetrate into the heart of a text, to trace its origins and direction, and to see its place in the course of both Jewish and Christian theological de-

velopment. He introduces his study with a striking statement: "In particular has it become clear that the traditional convenient dichotomy between Judaism and Hellenism was largely false. In the fusions of the first century the boundaries between these are now seen to have been very fluid." Against this background his discussion is telling in its impact.

The failure to mention the other essays must not be understood as indicating want of merit. It is only that the reviewer has already more than transgressed his limits.

JAMES MUILENBURG

THE RENEWAL OF THE CHURCH, BY W. A. VISSER t 'HOOFT. *Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1956. 128 pp., $2.50.*

It is a commonplace these days to speak of the need for renewal in the Church. Whenever American ministers gather they are led almost inevitably to ask how the members of their congregations can begin to understand what it means to join the fellowship of the Church and to take seriously their commitment. But the danger is great that we shall look in the direction of techniques or strategy designed to revitalize the churches, and thereby overlook the only true source of renewal.

The General Secretary of the World Council of Churches has used the occasion of a lecture series to reflect on the basic questions about the meaning of renewal. From the beginning he makes clear that renewal relates to the churches as they exist in history, ever tending to obscure and deny the Lordship of Christ. There is a givenness about the Church which began at Pentecost. It need not and cannot be renewed.

The early chapters are concerned with the relation of God to the life of the people under the Old Covenant, in the Early Church, and in the history of the Church. In following this theme of renewal, Dr. Visser t'Hooft illuminates a very significant but little explored strand in the history of the Old and New Israel. It is the story of the tension between the old and the new, between orthodoxy that holds on to the past and openness to continual creation. The Church is unique among all other societies in this "extraordinary capacity for renewal." Here there is a dynamic that does not fit the patterns of secular thought, for at crucial moments the Holy Spirit has intervened in the life of the Church.

This emphasis upon the Holy Spirit seems particularly significant for our situation. Dr. Visser t'Hooft writes, "it is the institutional egocentricity of a church, its unwillingness to let itself be used by the Spirit, its wrong conception of what constitutes 'success', in short, its rejection of the renewal which is offered to it, which may cause its sickness unto death." (pp. 72-3) The whole history of the Church is the story of how the desire for the security of the status quo leads it "back from the open, dynamic life into which the Holy Spirit pours its gifts, to the closed, introverted life of self-perpetuation (p. 84)

The chapter headed "The Way of Renewal" is the most significant section of the book. Here the author considers in turn five conceptions of renewal, most of them fairly congenial to the American Churches. They are man's way of working for renewal, adapting the institution to the new situation, using new methods of approach and all the rest. Discarding these approaches, he suggests the elements that are involved in true renewal. Here the initiative is firmly in God's hands. It is for man to wait, not passively to be sure, but expectantly, prayerfully; above all, open to the Scriptures. Then repentance may come, and only then is renewal possible. For repentance means the absolute dependence of the Church

upon its Lord. Then can follow the restoration of true fellowship, the "koinonia of the Holy Spirit," and the calling of the Church back to its evangelistic and missionary task.

G. W. WEBBER

RELIGIOUS BUILDINGS FOR TODAY, ED. BY JOHN KNOX SHEAR, *New York, The F. W. Dodge Corporation. 183 pp., $7.50*

THE CHANGING CHURCH, BY KATHARINE M. MCCLINTON. *New York, Morehouse-Gorham Company. 144 pp., $7.50.*

Both of these books are welcome additions to the library of anyone attempting to cope with church-building for modern people conscious of living in a modern age. Mr. Shear's book is a most skillful and discerning editing of articles appearing in the *Architectural Record* during the last few years. The danger of so well-illustrated a book is that one tends to view the text as a series of expanded sub-titles. Nothing could be more mistaken. The Reverend Marvin Halverson's essay, "On Getting Good Architecture for the Church," for example, is essential reading for any architect or clergyman who purposes to design or build a church—regardless of style. The essays on the Jewish, Catholic, Orthodox, Episcopal, Reformed, and Lutheran Traditions are concise, objective statements, refreshingly far-removed from the "cloud-cuckoo land" of Bunthornesque ecclesiology. John Stewart Detlie, Otto Spaeth, and Mario Salvadori examine in turn architecture, worship and the arts, and structural potentials from a contemporary point of view. Mr. Spaeth's inaccuracy in stating the motives behind the thinking of the authorities of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine is not to be taken as intentional prejudice—he is even ruder about one impending structure in his own Church. In connection with the Cathedral, there is one superb flight of skill and imagination done as a Master of Fine Arts thesis by John M. Woodbridge. It is, of course, intended as an academic solution to an academic problem, but certain elements of it—the central altar with the continuous runway from the Great Choir, and the enormous cage-like tower over the crossing —are suggestions worth pondering. Still on the subject of cathedrals, it is pleasant o read the brilliant analysis of the hotly-debated Coventry Cathedral plans written by the architect himself, Basil Spence. This superbly-illustrated article is both magnificent reading and of a religious intensity rarely put down on paper by Englishmen.
on paper by Englishmen.

One tragic note enters the book, and it is dangerously symbolic; one of the best bas-reliefs on one of the best churches is shown on a spread which includes on its other half one of the poorest examples of 19th Century sentimental inconography imaginable.

Mrs. McClinton's book is designed for lay consumption, although much of its material is invaluable to architects, designers, and craftsmen. There is a large amount of technical information which will be of value to craftsmen and altar guilds. Some of the dimensions are misleading (a funeral pall, for example, should be 9' x 12' rather than 6' x 9'), but this is not important in a book so generally adequate. A Building Committee would do well to examine the sections on organs, sacristies, social centers, and church schools. The illustrations are, in general, excellent and worth the price of the whole book. Apart from certain small technical errors, the book suffers only from the lack of an index.

Both books are excellent, and both reflect fairly the trend of church architecture and arts which adorn it. Some fundamental problems, however, are made serious, rather than solved.

by some of the tendencies indicated. In an altar-centered church, the altar should be lighted, rather than silhouetted against the light. Nothing is more mesmeric or bad for the human eye than looking into the light. The Church of the Heavenly Rest and St. Thomas Church (both in New York) have satisfactory "East Windows" only because the colour is so deep that it only seems to emerge from the blackness after a person has been gazing at them for a considerable time. And what of the theology behind the "goldfish-bowl" type of building? Are not clear glass picture windows more appropriate to pantheism than to Christianity? Zion Lutheran Church in Portland, Oregon, designed by Pietro Belluschi, the Lutheran Church of Our Redeemer in Los Angeles, designed by Charix and Johnson, and St. Clement's Church, Alexandria, Virginia, designed by Joseph H. Saunders, all meet these questions with altar-centered buildings in which the other-worldly Mysteries of Christ are dominant. The Church withdraws from the world to be fed and strengthened, to return to the world for that world's redemption. The exciting and, in many ways, brilliantly designed Chapel of the Holy Cross, built in the splendid cliffs of Arizona, has as its ulimate focal point an altar set in front of a clear glass window, looking out on a majestic view. The principal divisions are determined by a deep, cross-shaped mullion, on the interior of which is mounted an heroic-sized Corpus. As fine as it is, it is, from the reviewer's point of view, the exact reversal of the thing called for—and doubly dangerous, since it is so attractive.

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

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OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Inc.

GOD IN THE GARDEN, by Curtis Mitchell. *Garden City, Doubleday and Company, 1957. 195 pp., $2.50.*

To read this book inevitably means to evaluate the Madison Square Garden Billy Graham Crusade itself, which consumed so much Protestant energy in metropolitan New York during mid-year 1957. Curtis Mitchell, feature writer for the *American Weekly*, has written what is called a "full account" of this experience in 19th century mass evangelism executed by means of 20th century techniques. Billy Graham himself has written a short introduction which implies tacit approval, and has allowed extensive quotations from his personal diary which often prove enlightening.

Most of the facts are here, presented in a Winchell-like, hammered, staccato style: the preparation and publicity build-up; the organization of the thousands of singers, ushers, and counselors; the advance-prayer program; the $2,500,000 expenditures; the 56,000 "decisions" (Billy Graham seems to prefer "inquirers") in the Garden; the 65,000-soul harvest from the telecasts which had such a tremendous mail response. Very little information seems to have been left out, and Mr. Mitchell has even included the troublesome question of how many people were in Times Square the night of September 1st for the final rally—125,000, as he says, or 75,000 as the police estimated. In fact, the story as related is so exhaustive that it proves to be exhausting. Some material is repeated three or four times, as though hastily compiled. One wishes that this semi-official report might have been more ordered and tempered, such as that which Tom Allan edited for the "Crusade in Scotland."

The story here is told with obvious passionate approval; the only suggestions of reservations or criticisms are contained in quotations from individuals like Reinhold Niebuhr and "columnist" John Crosby. These are dismissed with haste, while scorn is directed against what were honest questions raised by dedicated pastors, often by those in some of the most difficult areas of the city. To whom is he referring if not to these latter when he calls them "disgruntled, nose-out-of-joint malcontents" who are speaking "disaster from their puny pulpits?"

We rejoice with Mr. Mitchell in the positive results of the New York Crusade. Thousands of church members were encouraged, others were given a welcome opportunity for rededication. Undoubtedly there were startling spiritual awakenings. There was closer (although sometimes uneasy) cooperation between various groups within Protestantism. Some ministers found new courage and incentive in their own churches. The momentum toward the establishment of prayer cells and small study groups has not yet diminished. The Protestant Council of the City served as a steadying influence in the consultations with the "Team." And finally, the value of visitation evangelism (which Billy Graham has said is to be preferred to mass evangelism) was demonstrated as a means of completing the ordinary Crusade pattern.

However, it may be seriously questioned whether there was any great "change of climate" in the city as a whole, as is claimed. Billy Graham, after a motor tour through various sections, began to become aware of the tremendous changes and problems which confront the churches in New York, and confessed in his diary that "we are not even scratching the surface of this mighty city." Surely it is too early to make any final assessment; the pastors active in our Protestant churches in the city must help in such an evaluation, and scarcely any of them are quoted in this book. But who is to say that God was not in the Garden in the summer of 1957, even though no one walked there alone? After all, He chooses His own ways.

Kenneth O. Jones



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THE CHURCH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, BY WINBURN T. THOMAS AND RAJAH B. MANIKAM. *New York, Friendship Press, 1956. 192 pp., $2.50 in cloth, $1.25 in paper.*

In a real sense this description of the churches in Southeast Asia could only have been written in the last ten years. Before that no direct knowledge of the total life and activity of Protestant Christians existed, except as it might have been drawn together in some missionary research center in the West. Here Winburn Thomas and Rajah Manikam draw from their direct knowledge within the churches, speaking with "the Church" as the focal point of Christian concern and endeavor. More than anything this inner perspective enables them to encompass the varied forms of church life and missionary activity with the general conception of the Church. For the movement of Asian Christians together—and here we must include East and South Asia also—has been a consequence of that realization of the nature and purpose of the Church which has taken precedence over every other missionary concern from abroad and Christian responsibility within Asia itself. If it seems that the idea of *the Church* in Southeast Asia is a fiction, it can be said that there is a reality which, having recently appeared on the horizon, grows brighter into a new day.

This survey of church organization in the area from Taiwan and the South Pacific islands on the one side to Burma on the other gives a birds-eye view for those who want to know how the churches have grown. The book would be superficial for any study of the state of the Church did it not introduce the complexity of the situation where western denominational Christianity has given birth to as varied a family as it represents in itself. When sketching the background of Evangelical Christianity in the Philippine Islands, for instance, the authors must resort to the combination, "Baptist-Congregational-Episcopal-Methodist-Presbyterian." But this is a relatively simple de-

nominational formula when one considers the ever more complex relationships arising, as in the case of Malaya, where the "accessions" of new missions since the closing of China "have expanded the Christian operations, but they have also increased denominational rivalry and have resulted in criticism and recrimination by those who feel that they alone have the truth." The historic missions in this situation manifest a unity which is surprising in its depth and reality when compared with the divergence of their own development, and the separation, and even discord, arising among some more recent arrivals. Steps toward unity have been taken by the churches, in the Philippines for example, where there is the United Church of Christ, and in many lands where federations or councils of churches bring the denominational churches nearer to each other. "Christians in the West," the authors state, "may regard church union as a luxury. In non-Christian Southeast Asia, it is a necessity." The yearning for fellowship evinced by Christian people in Southeast Asia needs all possible understanding and encouragement from the related churches in the West.

How the growth of the Church can be assisted is the major question of mission boards and missionaries. Looking at that growth in terms of the familiar formula of self-government (or control), self-support and self-propagation, Winburn Thomas and Rajah Manikam find greater advance in the first than in the other two. The churches considered apart from institutions are in wide areas still dependent on financial support from abroad, and will need assistance for some time to come, unless there is a decisive change in the practice of "stewardship." The authors attempt no solutions except in the broadest terms, and leave us to imagine what may be the more specific necessities of missionary policy in the new day where the idea of the Church is in foreground and the idea of the Mission exists only as a dependent concept.

The task is unfinished and it is immensely formidable. A glimpse at the difficulties created by the new vitalities of non-Christian religions and cultures, the appeals and interests of communism, and the pressures of secularism is sufficient to convince the observing Christian from abroad that the task belongs to the whole Church. For, in the opinion of the authors, "In this life and death drama, the mission has a vital role to play. That role is to undergird the younger churches that now have the responsibility but lack the resources in personnel and money with which to do the job."

ERNEST F. SCOTT

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE: A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE BY JOHN HICK. *Cornell University Press, 1957.* 221 *pp.*, $3.50.

This is a valuable book. It really *is* "modern"; it faces problems which are still being raised by one of the most vigorous and influential kinds of philosophy in post-war Britain. But Dr. Hick's debt to the Oxford analysts could be overestimated; his religious epistemology makes him largely a debtor to the Kantian tradition—and perhaps it is not without significance that the thought of John Oman, in whom he finds "an important key to the problem of religious knowledge," was cast in a Ritschlian mould and owed much *directly* to Kant as well. Dr. Hick's own description of his essay is: "an attempt to work out Oman's basic standpoint in relation to the very different world of contemporary philosophy." His central task is to set forth an epistemology of religious faith; he is concerned only to show the structure of the religious man's supposed aware-

ness of the divine, and he is not at all interested in trying to make a case for the actual existence of the alleged object of faith. For the agnostic the "inquiry is a hypothetical one."

The discussion falls into four parts. The first deals with cognition in general: *under what circumstances* is the use of the term "knowledge" appropriate, and *what is taking place* on those occasions when we may appropriately be said to "know?" The traditional infallibilist understanding of knowledge is rejected in favour of a view of knowledge as "rational certainty." Some sound criticisms are offered against the infallibilist thesis that "to know *p* entails that *p* is true," but I am not convinced by Dr. Hick's attempt to demonstrate that infallibilist knowing *never does* occur—and I doubt if his thesis really requires him to demonstrate this at all. We may grant the legitimacy of using "knowledge" for "rational certainty," and need not be greatly put out when Gilbert Ryle and the use-analysts inform us that this is to use the term "knowledge" in a non-standard way. To know is to be certain, though this does not exonerate us from the obligation to *test* our certainties; knowledge is *rational* certainty. The second chapter is a careful analysis of the elements in "belief," and the extravagances of recent dispositionalism (which attempts to equate "I believe *p*" with "I have a disposition to act as-if-*p*") are duly corrected.

Part II is devoted to a critique of three current views of faith which Dr. Hick finds inadequate, though "from each of them a significant truth is carried forward" to Part III, the main section of the book in which he turns to positive exposition of his own view of religious faith. Here the author states his central thesis that faith is the interpretative factor in the believer's awareness of God and that, as such, it is continuous with the interpretative element in all cognition. Faith is the recognition (or apprehension) of significance. There are three main orders of significance, corresponding to our natural, social, and supernatural environments. A traveller comes upon a stranger lying injured by the roadside: at the natural level of significance a sense-field is interpreted as a particular configuration of stone, earth and flesh; at the moral level the scene is interpreted as an obligation to render aid to an injured fellow-man; at the religious level this (and every) situation is interpreted as mediating the presence of God—in this instance, the God who demands our obedience. We need have no quarrel, I think, with Dr. Hick's epistemology—indeed, it presents a view of religious faith which fits extremely well with recent theological expositions of the nature of revelation as the divine self-disclosure mediated through man's interpreting aright the significance of historical events.

The second chapter of Part III (ch. 7) is the one which will, I imagine, stir up the most controversial dust. The theistic assertion arises as an act of interpretation; but it also functions as a metaphysical explanation. It is here, of course, that Dr. Hick runs up against the critique of speculative metaphysics in contemporary British philosophy, and he proceeds to discuss the relation of the theistic assertion to the concepts of "probability" and "meaning." When he points out that we can no longer weigh metaphysical systems one against another as relatively more or less probable, that the concept of *probability* simply does not apply to theism or to any other world-view, many of us will be happy to follow; the most that we would wish to establish is that theism is a permissible or possible interpretation of human experience. We will be quite happy to be rid of the old-fashioned "theology of proofs," which really received a death-wound at the hands of David Hume, though so many theologians seem to suppose only that it is very, very sick. In any case, as Dr. Hick repeatedly points out, whether

God exists is a "matter of fact" (perhaps he should say "of experience"), not a matter for demonstration.

But when Dr. Hick goes on to defend the *meaningfulness* of the theistic assertion by appeal to the survival-claim which he considers an essential part of it, even those whose sympathies are with him up to this point may begin to boggle. The theistic assertion is not, he concedes, open to experimental verification here and now, but it is still meaningful (still a factual assertion) since it *will* be open to verification when we turn the last corner of our earthly pilgrimage—in short, when we're dead. This is no place to embark on a critique of the appeal to a survival-claim (to which we had already been subjected by, amongst others, I. M. Crombie); but one wonders whether this is the kind of verification which would satisfy a resurrected positivist on the Last Day—if not, wouldn't it be kinder for us not to allow his demand for verification at the outset? The falsificationist's objection to the theistic assertion, I am willing to concede, could not be treated so cavalierly: it *can* be stated very embarrassingly for the theist. But this is a very large issue.

In a concluding chapter (Part IV, ch. 9) Dr. Hick's general conception of religious faith is applied to the distinctively Christian apprehension of God. Faith in the deity of Christ, for instance, is said to be an interpretation of a human life as being more than human—as being "continuous with the life of God."

All in all this is a penetrating and carefully-reasoned essay, profound yet luminously clear, and should fulfil its announced purpose very well—to serve as a "modern introduction to the problem of religious knowledge."

On page 74 "*glaube*" should presumably be "*Glaube*"; on page 90 "decoram" should be "decorum."

BRIAN GERRISH

THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. *New York, Oxford University Press, 1957. 1492 pp., $17.50.*

What does one say in 400 words about a dictionary with 1492 double-column pages, selling for $17.50, which offers fairly inclusive covering of the Christian faith from Aaron to Zwingli?

One way to write such a review would be to hold the editor before a bar of judgment which implies, "Now if *I'd* been given the job of compiling this thing, I'd have . . ." and damning the editor for taking a different tack. Here one could say, "Since there is an article about Eliot, why not one about Auden?" or "Why is there no bibliography for an important word like 'covenant'?" This is a fairly easy task, since every one can find *something* about a dictionary that he doesn't like.

Another method would be to look at some of the space allocations and draw Significant Conclusions from them. Thus: "One wonders why the editor feels that 'Theosophy' deserves more extended treatment than 'Theology'," or, "The treatment of 'Analogy' is remarkably good, considering the limited space which was accorded it."

Again, it would be a temptation, almost irresistible, to collect a sizeable number of typographical errors and then indulge in public musing about how they ever slipped through the copy editor's fingers. (I finally did find one on p. 515, lines 35, left hand column).

Finally, one could try to ferret out the theological slant of the editor and then make superior comments about "slanting" the material. Here the question could be, "Why are Tillich and Niebuhr and Brunner and Calvin not given more sympathetic treatment?"

Such comments would, however, be rather superficial reactions to what is actually a monumental piece of research. The editor is quite candid about the fact that a work such as this is necessarily selective; that there is, in

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fact, more attention to Christianity in Great Britain than on the Continent; that the treatment of Biblical subjects has had to be held within rigid bounds, and that there are inevitably going to be misprints in the first edition of a work this large. The proper reaction therefore is one of gratitude for the industry which has produced this very useful reference volume.

Perhaps the most helpful features of the dictionary are the bibliographies after each important word, and the system of cross-referencing by asterisks before each word listed eleswhere in the dictionary. These features mean that in almost every case the particular article being read can be the starting point for further research rather than the terminal point. Union students will therefore find it invaluable not only for nailing down elusive bits of information before hour tests, but also for getting a good running start on a subject which looks as though it might have possibilities for a term paper.

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THEOLOGY BETWEEN YESTERDAY AND TOMORROW, BY JOSEPH L. HROMADKA. *Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1957. 106 pp., $2.75.*

It is difficult to know how to approach this book, the work of a prominent churchman of the communist world. Avowedly it is special pleading for a kind of understanding we in our situation must find it hard to provide. Dr. Hromádka, Dean of the Comenius Faculty of Theology in Prague and a member of the Central Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches, argues that theology is bound to no system of politics, that processes of history have wrought political changes the liberal democracies can do nothing about, and that therefore we of the West ought not to criticize men of the churches of the East if their primary tone is not prophetic and their primary activity subversive. He allows that the situation under communism is in some respects bad for the church, but declares that "the responsibility of our Western Christian brethren to us who live on the other side of the various curtains is to understand our effort toward a constructive and positive understanding of the society in which we live." (p. 70).

This is said in the midst of a statement of the aims of Protestant theology which is neither novel nor especially profound, though it is adequate to the lecture platform (these chapters were the 1956 Laidlaw lectures at Knox College, Toronto). Theology transcends philosophy but must take history seriously. The church stands against the world but is tainted by it, and in the West shares the guilt of Western civilization in the exploitation of Asian and African peoples. Few serious Christians would quarrel even with the final assertion, but it is questionable that "all that has taken place during revolutionary uprisings was greatly outweighed by the wrongs, injustice, exploitation, pride, and arrogance on the part of Christian civilized ruling classes during the last two or three centuries." (p. 66) And the tacit assumption that communist society is righting these wrongs seems from the West totally unjustifiable. Dr. Hromádka is contrasting the worst practices of the West with the best pretensions of the East.

The real question posed by the book, therefore, is whether any genuinely Christian understanding of communist society can ever be "constructive and positive." Communist society in Dr. Hromádka's view adds economic liberty to political liberty enjoyed in the West. And "Marxistic philosophy claims to unveil the most reality and to free men from illusions or outright deceit." (p. 74) He judges "that the meaning of Marxistic atheism is radical humanism. The center of gravity of it is not what we call negative godlessness, but an effort to free man and human society of anything that has crippled his understanding and his capacity to master the laws of nature, society, and history." (pp. 82-3) He sees the possibility of a "fertile, creative controversy" beyond ideology, if the church can help communist society to see that man is something more than the creature of history. On the basis of such statements as these, the reader will have to judge whether Dr. Hromádka can be trusted that "there is no danger of losing sight of the dividing line between Christian faith and communist ideology." (p. 70) But to this reviewer the line is obliterated by Dr. Hromádka's inconsistencies and moral relativism, and it seems to need definition in terms which cannot help but challenge the present regime.

J. B. S.

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